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Abstract
In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team
will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a
higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms
such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria each of the skill-balanced teams
has exactly 50% chance to win whenever the score is tied at any round. Consistent with
empirical evidence, we show that the current mechanism is not sequentially fair and
characterize all sequentially fair mechanisms. Taking additional desirable properties
into consideration, we propose and uniquely characterize a practical mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Soccer is not only the leading sport in the world in terms of fan base,1 revenue,2 and the
number of players in organized leagues,3 it also has a profound - albeit at times negative -
impact on countries and on ordinary people’s daily lives. Following a World Cup elimination
match between Honduras and El Salvador, soccer was blamed for instigating a 100-hour war
that took place in 1969 between these two neighboring countries with devastating conse-
quences.4 In addition, Edmans et al (2007) report that significant market declines following
soccer losses, especially after important losses such as those in World Cup matches. Thus,
soccer is a social and economic phenomenon throughout the world, especially with its major
national- or club-level tournaments, such as the World Cup, the European Cup, and the
Champions League. Consequently, special attention is paid to its match-deciding penalty
shootouts in elimination tournaments, which happen relatively frequently: Looking up the
FIFA website reveals that 19.1% of the 136 World Cup knockout matches since 1974 have
been decided by penalty shootouts.
Penalty shootouts currently constitute the only way to determine the winning team when
the score is tied in major soccer elimination tournament matches after the regular 90-minute
period and the 30-minute extra time, i.e., the overtime. It is customary to use tiebreak
mechanisms in many other sports as well to determine the eventual winner when the regular
match ends with a tie, e.g., tennis, ice hockey, field hockey, water polo, handball, cricket,
and rugby. As will be made clear below, the current penalty shootout mechanism is deemed
problematic by many. Any proposed changes to the current system should be practical,
transparent, and minimal for higher probability of adoption. Currently in a shootout, each
team takes five penalty kicks from the penalty mark in alternating order, and the order of
the kicks is decided by the referee’s initial coin toss such that the team that wins the coin
toss gets to kick first in each round. This mechanism has been used since 1970 with a recent
minor tweak according to which since 2003 the team that wins the toss decides which team
kicks first. If the shootout score is tied after each team takes five penalty kicks, sudden-
1FIFA World magazine reported that “46.4 percent of the global population, saw at least one minute of
in-home television coverage of [the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa], representing an eight percent
rise on figures recorded during the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany.”
2Soccer accounts for 43% of the sports industry’s annual revenue, which is estimated to exceed $600
billion as of 2009 (see Zygband and Collignon, 2011). In addition, prominent soccer teams easily compare to
major conglomerates. Forbes reports that Real Madrid posted a revenue of $650 million during the 2011-12
season and is worth $3.3 billion (see Ozanian, 2013).
3FIFA reported that 265 million people played soccer in organized leagues in 2007 worldwide, which is
more than any other sport (http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/bigcount/).
4It “left several thousand dead on both sides [and] turned 100,000 people into homeless and jobless
refuges” (Durham, 1979).
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Figure 1: Empirical Evidence from Table 5.1 in Palacios-Huerta (2014) and Table 1 in
Kocher, Lenz, Sutter (2012): The winning proportions of first-kicking teams are given on
the vertical axis while the numbers of shootouts in the considered championships are given
on the horizontal axis. Euro int refers to combined proportion for all European international
championships such as European Championship, Champions League, Cup Winners Cup, and
UEFA Cup.
death rounds are reached, which go on until the tie is broken such that the kicking order is
preserved or “fixed” in these extra rounds.
The current fixed-order shootout mechanism is perceived to be “unfair” by soccer pro-
fessionals. Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) found that “in each and every case that
[they] were able to observe with just one exception, the winner of the coin toss chose to
kick first.” Further, in a survey of more than 240 players and coaches in the professional
and amateur leagues in Spain reported by the latter study, almost 96% indicated that they
would choose to kick first after winning the coin toss. So there is a perceived first-mover
advantage among soccer professionals.
Empirical evidence seems to support this perception (Figure 1). More specifically,
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010), using a dataset of 269 shootouts extending until
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2008, found that the first kicking team wins significantly more often around with 60.5%
probability. Kocher, Lenz, and Sutter (2012) showed that this probability is only 53% in a
dataset extending until 2003 with 540 shootouts (including all shootouts the previous study
used until 2003 as a subset as well).5 Palacios-Huerta (2014), using a larger dataset (includ-
ing the datasets from the previous two studies as subsets) extending until 2012 with 1001
shootouts), reported that the first-mover advantage is recovered with almost 60% probabil-
ity. The common theme in these studies is that while an overall second-mover advantage
definitely does not exist with increasing data size, a case can be made for a first-mover
advantage.
Another observation made by these empirical studies is that the degree of how much kick-
ing order matters may differ across different soccer competitions/traditions. For example,
in all the studies mentioned above, although kicking order does not matter for the German
national cups, the Spanish national cup shootouts notoriously favor first-kicking teams signif-
icantly. On the other hand, in English national cups, the first-kicking team has only a slight
advantage. These three countries represent different soccer styles and player characteristics,
and their datasets consist of hundreds of shootouts. Therefore, another important empirical
conclusion is that in different tournament/country environments the current shootout mech-
anism leads to different focal outcomes in terms of first- and second-moving teams’ winning
chances.
Given the above empirical evidence, this paper models soccer shootouts as a mechanism
design problem with a fairness desideratum in mind. Shootouts tend to be shorter and
more structured than a regular match and can be modeled similarly to dynamic versions of
contests. We introduce such a model in which the kickers care not only care about their
team’s winning the shootout but also about the outcome and even the quality of the penalty
shot they personally took. Given that fairness, rather than revenue maximization and even
efficiency, is the main desideratum of the design of tiebreaks, the first important question
we address is what fairness means in this real-world environment, where an unbiased coin-
toss determines the first-kicking team. We tackle this question from two different angles:
Whenever the score is tied after any round in a penalty shootout, having two teams (1) that
5Although this result is not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.12 at 10% level, Figure 1 in Kocher
et al. (2012) shows that the lowest this probability gets is 51.4%, which takes place during the period
1992–2003. On the other hand, at recent intervals (i.e., after 1999), the probability approaches 60%. The
statistical insignificance seems to come from the fact that they only consider the first 33 years of the shootout
practice. The justification stems from the fact that there was a small change in the shootout rules in 2003.
Starting from 2003, the initial coin toss has been used to determine who will pick to go first or second. While
before, the coin-toss was used to determine who will go first. We are aware of only very few instances since
2003, where the coin-toss winner chose to go second. On the other hand, Palacios-Huerta (2014), which
covers the period 1970–2012, shows a significant shift to first-mover advantage in the years since 2003, and
hence, for the entire period.
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are totally balanced in terms of their players’ shootout abilities, a sequentially fair outcome
should mean that each team is expected to win the shootout with 50% probability, and (2)
where one team has higher-ability kickers than those of the other team, then the higher-
ability team should have a higher probability of winning. These two parts lead to nothing
but the age-old Aristotelian Justice principle, which rests on a two-part criterion: equals
should to be treated equally and unequals unequally (cf. Aristotle, 1999).6
Complying with the above empirical findings, we first show that kicking order matters to
each team’s chance of winning the shootout in that the current fixed-order mechanism (1) is
not sequentially fair and (2) can lead to many equilibria, with different winning probabilities
for first- and second-kicking teams. We show that it is possible to devise a forward-looking
equilibrium refinement – similar in vein to the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987)
– to get rid of the multiplicity of equilibria, so that the first-kicking team wins more often.
Any potential equilibrium candidate with the second-mover advantage does not survive this
refinement.
We then ask whether it is possible to devise a shootout mechanism that is sequentially
fair. In our characterization of sequentially fair mechanisms in regular rounds, we find
that there is only one exogenous mechanism, namely the random-order mechanism – in
which the kicking order before any round is determined by an unbiased coin flip – that is
sequentially fair. Exogenous mechanisms, which, like the current fixed-order mechanism,
have a predetermined, random, or fixed kicking-order pattern by teams are otherwise not
sequentially fair. Some examples of sequentially unfair exogenous mechanisms are thus the
fixed-order mechanism and the one in which the kicking order reverses in each round, namely
different versions of the alternating-order mechanism.
We then identify a continuum of other sequentially fair mechanisms in regular rounds,
which turn out to be endogenous. Any sequentially fair endogenous mechanism has the
following structure: when the score is tied at the end of any round, the kicking order can
be determined arbitrarily (randomly or not), while when score is not tied at the end of any
round, the team that is ahead goes first with a predetermined probability (as a function of
the score and the round number in the next round). That is to say, if one team or the other
leads at the end of any round, the same probability applies to either team for kicking first.
For example, the mechanism can deem the team that is ahead after Round 1 to go first in
Round 2 with some probability α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, there is a continuum of sequentially fair
mechanisms. We also show that sequentially fair mechanisms satisfy the second part of the
Aristotelian Justice principle: among two teams with unequal kicking skills, the better team
6Observe that the use of a coin toss as a simple tiebreak mechanism, as FIFA did before 1970 (see Section
3), would be sequentially fair and satisfy the first part of our (Aristotelian) justice criterion (equals), but it
would fail its second part (unequals). Thus, our justice criterion rules this simple tiebreak mechanism out.
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will have a higher probability of winning the shootout at symmetric equilibria.
Because of the continuum of the sequentially fair mechanisms in regular rounds, one
needs to resort to criteria other than sequential fairness to refine the set of mechanisms that
can be deemed desirable. Among the sequentially fair mechanisms, goal probabilities may
differ; some may involve coin tosses or a kicking-order switch at every round while others
may minimize these tosses or switches. In Section 8, where we adopt the approach of market
design, we discuss the relative merits of different ex post fair mechanisms in terms of these
additional practical criteria. We show that there is a class of sequentially fair mechanisms
satisfying either the dominance property (an efficiency property on goal production and
exerting maximum effort) or the instant rectifiability property, which we term the behind-
first mechanisms, such that the team that is behind in score after a round always kicks first in
the next round, but if the score is tied after any round, then any random or fixed exogenous
or endogenous order is admissible at the next round.
Note that sequentially fair mechanisms, including behind-first mechanisms, leave unspec-
ified how one should choose which team would kick first when the score is tied, which would
be a major issue especially during the sudden-death rounds of a shootout. To find a plausible
remedy for this vagueness, from a practical point of view, we consider the alternating-order
mechanism, which is sequentially fair in the sudden-death rounds but not in regular rounds
of a shootout. Although there are many other ways to obtain sequential fairness in sudden-
death rounds, this mechanism provides a sudden-death equality of opportunity to both teams
in addition to its simplicity. We conclude by using this approach to combine a behind-
first mechanism with an alternating-order structure in a simple (and stationary) manner to
obtain a practical shootout scheme. Our simplicity axiom minimizes the patterns of how
kicking order changes across rounds while keeping the probability positive that either team
will kick first ex ante. We uniquely characterize the mechanisms satisfying sequential fairness
and dominance together with two axioms, namely, simplicity and sudden-death equality of
opportunity: the team that is behind in score after a round always kicks first in the next
round, but if the score is tied after any round, then the team that kicked second at that round
kicks first in the next round. We refer to this mechanism the alternating-order behind-first
mechanism.
2 Other Related Literature
Apart from the papers mentioned in the Introduction, our paper is also related to the
following strands of research. In the first strand, Chiappori et al. (2002) studied soccer
penalty kicks both theoretically and empirically to test mixed strategies, while Palacios-
Huerta (2003) did so with a much more empirical focus. Both papers considered regular
6
penalty kicks during matches rather than penalty kicks in shootouts. Bar-Eli et al. (2007),
after studying mostly regular penalty kicks and some shootout penalty kicks, observed that
goalies almost always jump right or left even though it would also be optimal for goalies to
stay in the goal’s center with some probability.7
In the second strand of literature, Carrillo (2007) considers having the penalty shootout
in soccer before overtime, where the shootout outcome counts only if the tie is preserved
during extra time. He finds that during overtime, this rule promotes offense (defense) for
the team that loses (wins) the shootout. He also provides conditions under which this rule
would dominate the current mechanism in terms of inducing more offensive play. Lenten et
al. (2013) provide empirical (simulation) support for Carillo’s (2007) proposal.
The third strand focuses on topics of economic design of sports contests, such as the
optimal number of entrants/teams in a race/league, the optimal structure of prizes (revenue
sharing) for a tournament (league), and so on. See Szymanski (2003) for a review of this
literature.
Before we finish this section, we need to make two important remarks. First, a precursor
of our concept of sequential fairness can be found in Che and Hendershott (2008), who
use a static one-shot version of it, ex post fairness.8 Finally, in a general sense, our paper
belongs to market design, a relatively new field seeking to provide practical solutions mainly
to resource-allocation problems in which monetary transfers are not allowed simply because
such transfers would draw legal and ethical objections (e.g., public school slots and human
kidneys are not allowed to be traded for money). Penalty shootouts are also in that category
since the right to kick first in a round cannot be assigned via monetary transfers.9
7Both studies find that kickers kick it to the middle relatively rarely and that “goalies almost never stay
in the middle.” Chiappori et al. also note that kickers in regular penalty kicks do not kick to the middle
unless their team’s score advantage is already large enough.
8In the National Football League (NFL), matches that end in a tie are determined by a sudden-death-like
overtime. The initial coin toss yields a significant advantage to the team that wins it and the outcome fails
to be ex post fair. Che and Hendershott (2008, 2009) propose “auctioning off” or “dividing-and-choosing”
the starting possession to restore ex post fairness.
9Clearly, in the absence of monetary transfers, efficiency and fairness need to be achieved through other
means. Nevertheless, market design enjoyed impressive success in particular in organizing markets such as
the one between medical interns and residents, in assigning students to public schools or to courses at a given
university, in allocating housing to immigrants and dorm rooms to college students, and in creating paired
kidney exchanges between kidney donors with medical incompatibilities and transplant patients (see, e.g.,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2013; Che, 2010; Nobel Prize Organization, 2012; So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2011,
2013).
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3 Background on Soccer and Shootouts
Until 1970, elimination matches that were tied after extra time were either decided by a coin
toss or replayed in two days if it was a finals match. Finally, the events in the 1968 European
football championship led FIFA in 1970 to try penalty shootouts instead.10 Given that the
current shootout mechanism is no panacea, FIFA experimented with the Golden Goal and
the Silver Goal between 1993 and 2004.11 It was hoped that these parallel measures would
produce more offensive play during overtime, and thus would effectively reduce the number
of penalty shootouts. However, they in fact led to defensive play to maintain the status-quo
score, and were eventually abandoned.
3.1 Unpredictability of Penalty Kicks
The soccer players who take the penalty kicks in shootouts are typically among the most
skilled and elite professionals in the world, while the task they have to perform is a relatively
easy but a risky one. It involves hitting a spot with the ball from 12 yards (approximately 11
meters) at a sufficiently high speed to elude a high-caliber goalie who is scrambling to protect
an eight-yard-wide goal. Thus, each such kick involves an element of risk and can turn out
to be costly for the kicker, especially if the miss is unambiguously his fault. The following
quote by Italy’s Roberto Baggio provides strong implications about plausible assumptions
regarding players’ preferences and the various basic physical aspects of a penalty kick (see
the next subsection):12
As for the penalty, I don’t want to brag but I’ve only ever missed a couple
of penalties in my career. And they were because the goalkeeper saved them
not because I shot wide. That’s just so you understand that there is no easy
explanation for what happened at Pasadena. When I went up to the spot I was
pretty lucid, as much as one can be in that kind of situation. I knew [the Brazilian
goalie] Taffarel always dived so I decided to shoot for the middle, about halfway
10A semifinal match was decided by a coin flip. The final match also ended in a tie after over time.
But because of the growing public outrage of soccer fans and since there was no further match left in the
tournament, authorities decided to replay this match in two days.
11The Golden Goal, introduced in 1993, means that the match ends instantly after the first goal during
extra time, and the team that scores it wins the match. The Silver Goal was announced in 2002 and ended
in 2004. With the Silver Goal, in overtime the team leading after the first fifteen-minute half would win, but
the game would no longer stop the instant a team scored.
12Baggio had a stellar career and his five goals in the tournament helped Italy to reach the final’s match
of the 1994 World Cup against Brazil. With the shootout score at 3-2, as the last kicker in regular rounds
Baggio had to score to keep Italy’s chances alive. He aimed for the middle but the ball sailed over the
crossbar. The quote is from Baggio’s (2001) autobiography Una Porta Nel Cielo.
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up, so he couldn’t get it with his feet. It was an intelligent decision because
Taffarel did go to his left, and he would never have got to the shot I planned.
Unfortunately, and I don’t know how, the ball went up three meters and flew
over the crossbar. . . . I failed that time. Period. And it affected me for years.
It is the worst moment of my career. I still dream about it. If I could erase a
moment from my career, it would be that one.
3.2 Kickers’ Preferences Over Outcomes and Physical Aspects of
Penalty Kicks
Clearly, the outcomes of players’ kicks pertain to their teams as well as to themselves. From
the team’s perspective a goal is preferred to a non-goal, and clearly there is no difference at
all between a saved kick and a kick that misses the goal. From Baggio’s quote, we also infer
that, from a player’s perspective, while scoring a goal is the best outcome and the goalie’s
save has to some extent a face-saving value, missing the penalty kick can be a devastating
outcome for a kicker. Thus, a kick can be extremely costly for the kicker if his kick misses
the goal, in which case the entire blame can be assigned to him unambiguously. One cannot,
however, posit whether a player’s individual utility from his kick or his collective utility from
his team’s winning the shootout should outweigh one another. For example, a player can be
somewhat happy and heartbroken at the same time (1) if he scored his penalty kick while
his team lost the shootout, or (2) if he missed his penalty kick outright while his team won
the shootout.
We also infer from Baggio’s quote (as well as from other studies mentioned before) that
goalies typically feel the need to dive. This is because, at the optimal speed-accuracy combi-
nations of world-class kickers, the kicked ball typically takes around 0.3 seconds to reach the
goal line (see, e.g., Harford, 2006; Chiappori et al., 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003), which is
less than the total of (1) roughly 0.2 seconds’ reaction time of the goalie to clearly recognize
the kick direction of the ball first, plus (2) the time during his dive to reach the expected
arrival spot of the ball before it reaches the goal plane. Hence, a goalie cannot afford to wait
until he clearly observes the kick direction: to prevent a goal with non-trivial probability,
he must commit to pick a side to dive - or alternatively to stay in the middle13 at the time
the ball is kicked. For that reason, for a significant portion of penalty kicks, the goalie and
the ball end up in opposite corners of the goal. Even when the goalie dives in the correct
direction, he cannot save a goal with 100% chance, since he must also be able to reach the
13As Baggio’s quote also indicates, a shot aimed at the middle may be missed outright or may hit the feet
or the legs of the diving goalie that cover part of the middle; thus, the shot can be saved even if the goalie
dives.
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ball.
4 Model
Two soccer teams, which we refer to as Teams 1 (T1 for short) and 2 (T2 for short), are
facing off in a penalty shootout. Each team shall take n sequential rounds of penalty shots.
Each round consists of one team kicking first, and, after observing the outcome of that shot,
the second team taking the next shot. If one team scores more goals than the other at
the end of n rounds, then it wins the match. We refer to these n rounds as the regular
rounds. Throughout the paper we will assume that n = 2. This is sufficient to characterize
sequential fairness and analyze the current scheme as well as other proposed mechanisms,
such as the alternating-order mechanism. Thus, with n = 2, the analysis is tractable and
yet rich enough to capture the multiround feature of penalty shootouts.14
If the shootout score is tied at the end of regular rounds, the format reverts to sudden
death; that is, each team takes on additional round of shots, and then, if one team scores
while the other one does not, the former team wins the match; otherwise a further round of
sudden-death penalty shots is taken. We refer to the sudden-death rounds as n+ 1, n+ 2, ....
Since potentially the match can continue forever, we assume that each team consists of
an infinite number of kickers and that each kicker takes at most one shot.15
A penalty kick consists of a probabilistic event with three outcomes: Either a goal is
scored (G), the shot goes wide (O), or the shot is saved by the goalie (S). The latter two
outcomes lead to the same score for the team: a goal is not scored.
While each kicker is a strategic player, for tractability the goalie is modeled as a proba-
bilistic machine (alternatively, if one would like to opt for a simple game in which the goalie
is also strategic, see the next footnote). The goalie waits in the middle of the goal line
prior to the shot. He jumps to one side or the other with probabilities 1
2
: 1
2
prior to the
penalty shot, as he needs to react early to have any realistic chance to save the kick. So
with probability 1
2
he reaches to the same side of the goal as the kick.16 Hence, we model
14We have n = 3 results in an online appendix at http://www2.bc.edu/˜unver/research/ASU-socccer-
shootouts-appendix-b.pdf, and no extra insight exists in this analysis. Similarly, we skip n > 3 as the
analysis becomes extremely cumbersome and lengthy without providing any further insight.
15In reality, each soccer player can take at most one shot, unless all players in his team have already kicked
penalty shots. As each team consists of 11 players, 11 shots need to be taken by each team before any player
can kick a second shot. As n = 5, this happens very rarely.
16Both Palacios-Huerta (2014) and Chiappori et al. (2002) conclude that the penalty kick may be described
by a simple 2x2 game with neutral-sided kickers to kick and goalies to dive. Then it would be clear that
each kicker would kick the ball right or left with 1/2 probability each and the goalie would dive to each side
with 1/2 probability. Thus, the equilibria of these games lead to our reduced-form goalie behavior.
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the goal line as a one-dimensional line segment [0, 1], where x = 0 refers to the center of the
goal, and x = 1 refers to the goal pole on the side of the kick.
Each kicker, who is a single-round player in our game, has an action summarized as
aiming at coordinate x ∈ [0, 1] of the goal line. When a kicker aims at x, the exact spot the
ball reaches on the goal line is determined by a continuous probability density function σx
in a closed support [x, x] for some x > x > x. The spot the ball reaches, y, is observable
by all other players, but not the intended spot, x. Both x and y are observable by the kicker
himself. Moreover, given that the shot is aimed at x, there is a PG(x) chance that a goal
will be scored; and a PO(x) probability that, the shot will go out (see Palacios-Huerta, 2014,
on that). Hence, the shot is saved by the goalie with probability 1 − PG(x) − PO(x).17 We
assume that PG, PO, and σx for all x ∈ [0, 1] are all common knowledge.
We assume that PG is a twice continuously differentiable strictly concave function, which
reaches its maximum at some x ∈ (0, 1).18 We assume that PG(x) > 1/2 for all x ∈ [0, x].
Function PO, on the other hand, is an increasing twice continuously differentiable convex
function. Increasing PO is straightforward to motivate: the closer to the middle the ball is
aimed, the lower is the chance that the ball will go out. Single-peakedness of PG is also easy
to motivate: Whenever the ball is aimed at low x values, it can be saved with a higher chance
by the diving goalie (see the previous footnote). For higher x values, although the goalie’s
chances of saving the ball decrease as he may no longer be able to reach it, the chances of
the ball going out increase. Hence, there is an optimal spot for the highest goal probability
x. Concavity of PG and convexity of PO are primarily assumed for the tractability of our
analysis, and do not play any other major role for the interpretation of our results.
We assume that each kicker on both teams is identical in ability and has the same goal-
scoring and kicking-out probability.
4.1 Shootout Mechanisms and Shootout Game
A shootout mechanism is a function, φ, that assigns a probability φ(hk−1, gT1 : gT2) to T1
kicking first in Round k, given the sequence of first-kicking teams in the first k − 1 rounds
is hk−1 = (hk−1r )
k−1
r=1 where h
k−1
r ∈ {T1, T2} is the team that kicked first in Round r and
17Actually PG and PO are summary functions obtained from the following process: As mentioned before,
the spot the ball reaches, y, is observable by all other players, but not the intended spot, x. If y > 1, then the
ball goes out. So PO(x) =
∫ x
y=1
σx(y)dy. On the other hand, the goalkeeper can save the ball that arrives at
spot y with probability S(y), which is a continuous function. Hence, PG(x) =
∫ 1
x
[1− S(y)]σx(y)dy. Hence,
we assume that the family of densities {σx}x∈[0,1] and save probability function S have all the properties
that need the below restrictions to hold for PG and PO.
18In fact PG is not concave around 0, and it is decreasing, as the ball can go both sides of the middle,
x = 0, when it is aimed at x = 0. Nevertheless, we assume the goal-maximizing point is farther to the right.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we use a strictly concave PG.
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gT1 : gT2 is the score (i.e., the goals scored by T1 and T2, respectively) at the beginning of
Round k. Thus, the probability of T2 kicking first in Round k is 1− φ(hk−1; gT1 : gT2).
Each shootout mechanism φ induces a hidden action extensive-form game, which we will
simply refer to as the game, such that the exact spot that each kicker aims the ball on the
goal line is unobservable by others. Given the current state (hk−1; gT1 : gT2), for Rounds
k = 1, 2, ..., the order of first-kicking teams in the previous k − 1 rounds hk−1, and feasible
scores gT1 : gT2, the nature determines with probability φ(h
k−1; gT1 : gT2) T1 kicking next
first and probability 1 − φ(hk−1; gT1 : gT2) T2 kicking next first. Then a kicker of the first-
kicking team takes the penalty shot, observing the state and the history of the outcomes of
all the shots up to that point as goal, out, or save. The kicker aims to some spot x ∈ [0, 1]
to maximize his expected individual payoff (which we explain in the next paragraph). Then
nature determines with probability distribution PG(x), PO(x), 1 − PG(x) − PO(x) whether
the penalty kick results in a goal, goes out, or is saved, respectively. After the outcome of
this shot is observed, the other team’s kicker takes a penalty shot, observing the history of
the outcomes of the shots up to that point. We continue until the end of Regular Rounds
k = n similarly. If the score is tied, then we continue with the sudden-death rounds until
the tie is broken at the end of a sudden-death Round k > n.
Each kicker aims to maximize his expected individual payoff in the game. Each kicker’s
payoff function consists of two additive components. The first is the utility received when his
team wins or loses the shootout: VW is the win payoff and VL < VW is the loss payoff. This
component of the payoff is common to each kicker. The second component of the individual
payoff consists of an individual outcome based valuation: If the kicker scores a goal he gets
utility UG > 0, if he kicks the ball out he receives payoff UO < 0, and if the goalie saves
the kick he receives payoff US = 0. This is a normalization that guarantees that scoring a
goal is the most desirable outcome, and kicking the ball out is less desirable than kicking
the ball inside the goal frame and yet the goalie saves the ball. With this normalization, we
can also drop a variable from our notation without affecting our analyses. Thus, overall ex
post payoff of a kicker i of Team Tk is then
ui,Tk = Vt + Up (1)
where t ∈ {W,L} refers to the overall team outcome, win or loss; and p ∈ {G,O, S} refers
to the kicker’s penalty outcome, goal, out, or save.
An information set is H ∈ Hi,Tk, i.e., the set of information sets that kicker i ∈ {1, 2, ...}
of Team Tk ∈ {T1, T2} can move, consists of the exact spot the ball went to for each of
the previous kicks, the team of the kick, and whether the kick was scored as a goal, went
out, or was saved by the goalie. They are observable by kicker i of Team Tk moving in
information set H, but not the intended spots of previous kicks. Each information set also
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has an associated round (without loss of generality indexed with the kicker, i.e. i’th round),
order of kicking in the round as 1st or 2nd, and a current score difference between T1 and T2.
We refer to all of this observable information as the state of the information set. Note that
from the point of view of the kicker, who is a single-shot player in the game, all payoff-relevant
information of an information set is given through its state.
A pure strategy Xi,Tk : Hi,Tk → [0, 1] is a function from the set of information sets that
team Tk’s kicker i can move to the spots that each kicker can target while taking the penalty
shot.
As alluded to before, this is a sequential hidden action game, as each player observes only
where the ball goes and whether the kick was a goal, out, or a save in previous kicks, but
not the intended spot towards which the ball was kicked. Hence, as a kicker takes a penalty
shot, he has a belief over intended spots of previous kicks. Formally, a belief µ(H) is a
function that maps each information set H ∈ Hi,Tk that Team Tk’s i’th kicker moves with
positive probability to a probability distribution over histories of actions taken that would
lead to the same information set.
4.2 Markov Perfection and State-Symmetric Equilibria
Our solution concept is state-symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SPBE), in which
strategies in regular rounds depend only on the state of the game, i.e., on the round number,
kicking order, and score difference; strategies in sudden-death rounds depend only on the
current kicking order and score difference. The strategies in SPBE are memoryless in that
they depend only on the current state.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the game of shootout mechanism φ is an assess-
ment, i.e., a strategy profile and a belief profile pair
[
X = (Xi,Tk)i∈{1,2,...},Tk∈{T1,T2}, µ =
(µ(H))H∈Hi,Tk,i∈{1,2,...},Tk∈{T1,T2}
]
such that for any {Tk, T `} = {T1, T2}, i ∈ {1, 2, ...}, and
H ∈ Hi,Tk,
• spot Xi,Tk(H) ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the expected value over all possible ex post payoffs
ui,Tk at information set H, given (X−i,Tk), (Xj,T `) among all spots in [0, 1]; and
• belief µ(H) is consistently derived by Bayes’ rule from φ, X, PG, PO, µ(H ′) for all
H ′ 6= H.
Observe that each kicker is a one-shot player and maximizes his individual expected
payoff over his ex post payoffs ui,Tk defined in Equation 1. The exact formulation of this
expected payoff will become clear in our analysis.
In this game, once the equilibrium strategies are found, beliefs are straightforward to
construct. At any information set H, the kicking player believes with probability one that
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other kickers before him used equilibrium strategies. This is because the payoffs explicitly
depend on the actual outcome of each kick, which is observable as Goal (G) or No Goal
(NG), not on the intended spots of kicks (which are not observable). Further, beliefs will
not play a role in finding the optimal strategies in equilibria as the kicker decides on his best
action by taking into consideration only future players’ kicks, not those of the past ones. We
will not explicitly calculate the beliefs from this point on, except when we refine the possible
multiple equilibria of the fixed-order mechanism.
Since we are making a fairness analysis over different shootout mechanisms, we will focus
on a Markovian symmetric equilibrium concept (i.e., unless we refine the possible multiple
equilibria of the fixed-order mechanism):
A state-symmetric assessment (X,µ) is defined as
• In regular rounds: Xi,Tk(H) = Xi,T `(H ′) and µ(H) = µ(H ′) for teams Tk, T ` ∈
{T1, T2} where both information sets H ∈ Hi,Tk and H ′ ∈ Hi,T ` pertain to the same
Regular Round i ≤ n, and the same kicking order, 1st or 2nd, in the round while the
score difference between T1 and T2 in H, s, and in H ′, s′, satisfy s = −s′ if T` 6= Tk
and s = s′ if T` = Tk.
• In sudden-death rounds: Xi,Tk(H) = Xj,T `(H ′) and µ(H) = µ(H ′) for any Tk, T ` ∈
{T1, T2} where information sets H ∈ Hi,Tk and H ′ ∈ Hj,T ` involve (possibly different)
Sudden-Death Rounds i, j > n but they refer to the same kicking order, 1st or 2nd,
while the score difference between T1 and T2 in H, s, and in H ′, s′, satisfy s = −s′ if
Tk 6= T` and s = s′ if Tk = T`.
A state-symmetric assessment in sudden-death rounds, for instance, dictates that two
players on the same team or different teams will exactly aim at the same intended spot
and have exactly the same beliefs if they were in each other’s shoes. Note that before
every sudden-death round the score is identical if the game reaches it, while before each
regular round after the first round it could be different. Unlike the sudden-death rounds,
the number of regular rounds is finite, and therefore the round number as well as the kicking
order and score would matter in regular rounds. Therefore, even if two teams are tied in
different regular rounds, the players who kick first need not use the same strategy in those
two rounds.
A state-symmetric equilibrium of a shootout mechanism φ is defined as a state-
symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game induced by φ. This solution concept
is identical to symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium if we ignored the beliefs and focused
only on strategies assuming that each state of the game spans a subgame of the game. As
noted above, beliefs play no role other than equilibrium selection when there are multiple
equilibria; this is without loss of generality.
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4.3 Sequential Fairness and Aristotelean Justice Criterion
Using the concept of state-symmetric equilibrium, we now define the key design concept
in our analysis as follows: an assessment (X,µ) of the game induced by mechanism φ is
sequentially fair if for all problems with balanced teams (i.e., for any underlying utility
values VW , VL, UG, UO and goal and out probability functions PG, PO), at any (h
k−1; gT1 : gT2)
with gT1 = gT2, - i.e., when they are tied at the beginning of Round k for any k -, each team
has exactly a 50% chance of winning. We will seek shootout mechanisms whose all state-
symmetric equilibria are sequentially fair. We will refer to such mechanisms, for short,
as sequentially fair mechanisms. Note that it is not the shootout mechanism that is
inherently fair, but its state-symmetric equilibria that need to be fair.
We will analyze sequential fairness in sudden-death rounds first. It will be useful to
formally define this concept. A mechanism is sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds if,
for all problems with balanced teams, for any sudden-death Round k > n, at any (hk−1; gT1 :
gT2) with gT1 = gT2, - i.e., when they are tied at the beginning of Round k -, each team has
exactly a 50% chance of winning.
Our desiderata are determining whether the current mechanism’s equilibria are sequen-
tially fair, inspecting other plausible mechanisms, and characterizing the class of sequentially
fair mechanisms.
Sequential fairness is the first part of the two-part Aristotelean justice criterion. We say
that a mechanism satisfies Aristotelean justice criterion if it is sequentially fair and, when
there is team with higher-ability kickers than those of the other team, whenever scores are
tied at the beginning of a round, the better team wins with a weakly higher probability (and
with a strictly higher probability at least at one round) at all state-symmetric equilibria.19
5 Analysis: A Kicker’s Optimization Problem
We first analyze each kicker’s optimization problem for a given mechanism φ and other agents’
strategies. The i’th kicker of Team Tk, denoted by ` ≡ Tk, i’s best response determination
problem boils down to
max
x`∈[0,1]
U`(x`;WG,`,WNG,`) ≡
(
PG(x`)WG,` + [1−PG(x`)]WNG,`
)
+
(
PG(x`)UG +PO(x`)UO
)
(2)
where PG(x`)WG,` + [1− PG(x`)]WNG,` is Kicker `’s expected continuation team payoff and
PG(x`)UG+PO(x`)UO is Kicker `’s expected individual kick payoff for expected continuation
values WG,` conditional on he scores and WNG,` conditional on he does not score. These
19We introduce an instance of unbalanced teams in Section 7.1 such that we can rank the teams as better
and worse teams.
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values, WG,` and WNG,`, are functions of the shootout mechanism, the score difference,
round number (i in this case), kicking order in that round, and the others’ strategy profile.
We drop them from our notation for simplicity.
Hence, the necessary first-order conditions for an interior maximum turn out to be
P ′G(x
∗
`)(WG,` −WNG,` + UG) + P ′O(x∗`)UO = 0. (3)
The second-order conditions lead to the first-order conditions being sufficient, since we have
P ′′G(x
∗
`)(WG,` −WNG,` + UG) + P ′′O(x∗`)UO < 0, (4)
which follows from the facts that P ′′G < 0, WG,` −WNG,` ≥ 0, UG > 0, P ′′O ≥ 0 and UO < 0.
Hence if an interior maximum exists it is unique given WG,` − WNG,`. We will refer to
WG,`−WNG,` as the expected marginal contribution of the kicker to his team. We turn
our attention to analyze the properties of the optimum for a kicker.
Proposition 1 At any interior best response of Kicker `, x∗` < x is the optimal goal-scoring
spot; and the higher his expected marginal contribution, the higher is his goal-scoring proba-
bility.
Also note that if kicking out and the goal being saved were valued equally, i.e., UO =
US = 0, then x
∗
` = x, i.e., x
∗
` would be optimal. But since x
∗
` < x because UO < US = 0, a
kicker chooses to kick more conservatively. The relative magnitude P ′G(x
∗
`)/P
′
O(x
∗
`) as well as
magnitudes of expected marginal contribution WG,` −WNG,`, UO, and UNG determine how
much he shaves off an optimal kick.
Next, we focus on fully solving WG,` − WNG,` for the current scheme, the fixed-order
mechanism.
6 The Current Scheme: The Fixed-Order Mechanism
The current shootout scheme is the fixed-order mechanism, in which the first kicker is deter-
mined before Round 1 with an even lottery and then the procedure continues with the same
kicking order throughout. Formally, the fixed-order mechanism φ is defined as follows:
φ(∅; 0 : 0) = 0.5 and φ(hk−1; gT1 : gT2) =
{
1 if hk−11 = T1
0 if hk−11 = T2
for all Rounds k ≥ 2, orders of first-kicking teams in the previous k − 1 rounds hk−1, and
feasible scores gT1 : gT2 at the beginning of Round k.
We will now characterize the state-symmetric equilibria of the fixed-order mechanism in
the sudden-death rounds.
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Without loss of generality assume that T1 wins the coin toss before Round 1 and kicks
first throughout.
At state-symmetric equilibria, if they exist, each T1 kicker will use exactly the same
action when he kicks in the sudden-death rounds, as T1 always goes first and the score is
tied at the beginning of each sudden-death round.
Similarly, by symmetry, each T2 kicker will use exactly the same action when his team
is behind (which can be by one goal at most); and he will use exactly the same action when
the score is even (which can happen if the preceding T1 kicker kicks out or his kick is saved).
On the other hand, T1 and T2 kickers may potentially use different actions at state-
symmetric equilibria, as they kick in different orders: in each round T1 goes first and T2
goes second.
Hence, if a state-symmetric equilibrium exists, the probability of Team i winning at the
beginning of each sudden-death round is the same for each i = 1, 2.
At a state-symmetric equilibrium, let us define VT1 to be the value function of T1, that is
the expected utility it contributes by winning or losing to its all kickers, in the first sudden-
death round. Denote by x the optimal kicking strategy for T1’s kicker. Define V BT2 to be
the value function of T2 in the first sudden-death round when T2 is currently behind by
one goal, V ET2 and to be the value function of T2 in the first sudden-death round when the
score is currently even. T2’s kicker’s optimal kicking strategy in each scenario is yB and yE
respectively.
We can write the following Bellman equation for VT1, where recall PG(x) is the goal
probability when the kick is aimed at x, VW is the team victory payoff for each kicker, and
VL is the team loss payoff for each kicker:
VT1 = PG(x)WG,T1 + [1− PG(x)]WNG,T1 (5)
using the language we developed in the previous section, WG,T1 is the future expected future
value conditional on the kicker scoring and WNG,T1 is the future expected value conditional
on the kicker not scoring. We have
WG,T1 =PG(yB)V
∗
T1 + [1− PG(yB)]VW (6)
WNG,T1 =PG(yE)VL + [1− PG(yE)]V ∗T1 (7)
such that V ∗T1 is the continuation payoff attributed to T1 in case the game goes to a second
sudden-death round.
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For T2, we have
V BT2 = PG(yB) V
∗
T2︸︷︷︸
=WBG,T2
+[1− PG(yB)] VL︸︷︷︸
=WBNG,T2
(8)
V ET2 = PG(yE) VW︸︷︷︸
=WEG,T2
+[1− PG(yE)] V ∗T2︸︷︷︸
=WENG,T2
(9)
where
V ∗T2 =VW + VL − V ∗T1 (10)
is the continuation payoff attributed to T2 in our win-or-lose game.
Next, we solve the decision problem faced by each kicker given other players’ actions and
beliefs using the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions given in Equation 3. Recall
that for a Kicker `
P ′G(x
∗
`)(WG,` −WNG,` + UG) + P ′O(x∗`)UO = 0 (11)
where x∗` is the optimal spot for Kicker `.
At equilibrium, x = x∗, yB = y∗B, and yE = y
∗
E, and hence we can solve them by plugging
Equations 5 – 10 into Equation 11. To do that we need to resolve the continuation values
V ∗T1 and V
∗
T2 for each team.
Hence, it is useful to note that in any state-symmetric equilibrium VT1 = V
∗
T1. Therefore,
by Equation 5,
V ∗T1 =
PG(x)[1− PG(yB)]VW + [1− PG(x)]PG(yE)VL
PG(x)[1− PG(yB)] + [1− PG(x)]PG(yE) = αVW + (1− α)VL (12)
where the winning probability of T1, α, is given by
α =
PG(x)[1− PG(yB)]
PG(x)[1− PG(yB)] + [1− PG(x)]PG(yE) . (13)
A value for α > 0.5 at a state-symmetric equilibrium will signal that the fixed-order mecha-
nism is biased in favor of the first-kicking team in the sudden-death rounds (and α < 0.5 is
vice versa for the second-kicking team). On the other hand, the fixed-order mechanism is a
sequentially fair mechanism if and only if α = 0.5 at every state-symmetric equilibrium. For
T2, then, we get by Equation 10,
V ∗T2 = (1− α)VW + αVL. (14)
Hence, Equations 5 – 10 through Equation 11 become self-contained to solve for x∗, y∗B and
y∗E. The following theorem characterizes the state-symmetric equilibrium strategy candidates
solving these equations:20
20In our analysis, we did not have to model the beliefs of agents explicitly. We use the summary functions
PG and PO, and the agents have to best respond to what the other players are doing at equilibrium. The
beliefs will be crucial in using the equilibrium selection criterion, though, later in Subsection 6.1.
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Theorem 1 (The fixed-order mechanism, sudden-death rounds) (i) A state-
symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if P ′G(0)[
VW−VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(0)UO ≥ 0.
(ii)When it exists, there may be multiple state-symmetric equilibria with strategy profiles
(x∗, y∗B, y
∗
E), all of which are to the left of the goal-optimal spot, satisfying
• x∗ = y∗E, i.e., the T1 kicker and T2 kicker, when the score is even, kick at the same
spot; and
• for every equilibrium with (y∗E, y∗B), there exists another equilibrium with (yˆE, yˆB) such
that yˆE = y
∗
B and yˆB = y
∗
E.
It will be useful to quantify “may be” in the above theorem. The below proposition
answers this question:
Proposition 2 Suppose that in the sudden-death rounds of the fixed-order mechanism, a
state-symmetric equilibrium exists. Then, multiple state-symmetric equilibria exist if and
only if there are multiple solutions β to the equation
β =
1− PG(y(1− β))
2− PG(y(β))− PG(y(1− β)) , (15)
where y(β) = f−1
( −UO
(VW−VL)β+UG
)
for f(x) = P ′G(x)/P
′
O(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, there is an odd number of solutions with β = 1
2
always being a solution and
others being located symmetrically around it. We also have y∗B = y(β) and x
∗ = y∗E = y(1−β)
for any solution β.
Thus, generically, the fixed-order mechanism is not sequentially fair as the winning prob-
ability of T1 α 6= 1
2
in equilibrium, whenever yB 6= yE.
Example 1 (Sequentially unfair equilibria) Suppose the game has the following struc-
ture:
VW − VL = 7; UG = 556.08
879
; UO = −15s
PG(x) = 0.82− 1.2(0.5− x)2; PO(x) = 270.232704
879s
x
It can be readily verified that for every s ≥ 1, (yE, yB) = (0.04, 0.03) (and hence (yE, yB) =
(0.03, 0.04)) constitutes an equilibrium.
Theorem 2 The fixed-order mechanism is not sequentially fair in general.
Its proof is immediately implied by Theorem 1. We will provide some intuition for this
result when we discuss sequentially fair mechanisms in the sudden-death rounds in Section
7.2.
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6.1 Equilibrium Refinement
Next, we address the question as to which state-symmetric equilibrium is more likely to
be observed when there are multiple state-symmetric equilibria in the fixed-order mecha-
nism. To that end, we use a selection criterion similar to Cho and Kreps’s (1987) “Intuitive
Criterion.” Suppose there are multiple state-symmetric equilibria. Let the state-symmetric
equilibrium with (x∗, y∗E, y
∗
B) be the one with highest x, i.e., the intended spot by T1’s kickers
is the closest to the goal-optimal spot among all state-symmetric equilibria. We will refer
to this equilibrium as the most aggressive equilibrium for T1 for the following reason: As
x∗ = y∗E > y
∗
B, we have the winning probability of T1, α =
1−PG(y∗B)
2−PG(y∗E)−PG(y∗B) >
1
2
by Equation
13; and moreover, such a winning probability for T1 is the highest among all state-symmetric
equilibria.
As a result, T1’s kickers can collectively enforce the most aggressive kicking equilibrium
for their team and win more often, in which the first kicker can set the tone of aggressiveness
for his team. Being the first mover, if T1 can credibly “signal” T2 that they are indeed playing
this most aggressive equilibrium, this would be the most beneficial for T1. In this case, we can
use such a signaling through beliefs in the state-symmetric equilibrium to obtain a refinement.
For example, if σx∗ , the probability density function of the ball reaching a particular spot on
the goal line when it is aimed at x∗ has the support set [x∗− x∗ , x∗+ x∗ ]. Suppose that this
support is disjoint from such support sets of other equilibria. Then, whenever T2 kickers
observe a kick spot in σx∗ ’s support, they can credibly deduce that indeed T1 is playing this
aggressive equilibrium. Hence, the beliefs of T2’s kickers in information sets that are never
reached in a state-symmetric equilibrium can be fine-tuned so that less aggressive equilibria
can be eliminated.
Definition 1 (Refinement Criterion) If the most aggressive state-symmetric equilibrium
for T1 involves aiming at x∗ for each kicker, and the possible spots that the ball can go under
x∗ (as determined by the support of σx∗, [x∗ − x∗ , x∗ + x∗ ]) are different from any of the
spots that the ball can go under all other state-symmetric equilibria, then T1 can credibly
enforce the most aggressive state-symmetric equilibrium.
Hence, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Team 1 wins more often) If the state-symmetric equilibria can be refined,
then T1, the team that kicks first, wins with a higher probability than T2 in the sudden-death
rounds of the fixed-order mechanism.
Hence, in our analysis with equally-skilled players and goalies, the fixed-order mechanism
is biased toward the first-moving team and further multiple equilibria certainly exist. Indeed,
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empirically as well, these multiple equilibria and the overall first mover advantage are evident.
The relative frequency figures regarding the winning probability of the teams that kick first
vary significantly across tournaments throughout the world (see Figure 1).
7 Mechanism Design: Sequentially Fair Mechanisms
In the previous section we concluded that the currently used fixed-order mechanism is not
sequentially fair. It turns out that even if we introduced a sequentially fair extension to the
fixed-order mechanism in sudden-death rounds, it would still be sequentially unfair.
In fact, a large class of intuitive mechanisms turns out to be sequentially unfair. A fitting
example of such mechanisms is the alternating-order mechanism, in which the kicking order
reverses in every round. Suppose T1 starts off the shootout; then T2 kicks first in Round 2,
T1 kicks first in Round 3, and so on. It turns out that even this mechanism is sequentially
unfair. In addition, a large class of mechanisms, which we refer to as exogenous mechanisms,
turns out to be sequentially unfair. A mechanism φ is exogenous if, for all rounds k, and
kicking orders hk−1 regarding the beginning of round k, φ(hk−1 : gT1 : gT2) = ρ(k) for
some function ρ, i.e., who goes first in each round is determined independent of the current
score but as a function of the current round. Hence, both fixed-order and alternating-order
mechanisms are exogenous, and even the version of the alternating-order mechanism in which
the 5th round’s kicking order is randomly determined is exogenous.
Another interesting exogenous mechanism is the random-order mechanism φ, which de-
termines who goes first in every round using an unbiased lottery, that is φ(hk−1; gT1, gT2) = 12
for all k. However, a biased random-order mechanism where the probability of which team
kicks first does not depend on the current score is sequentially unfair.
Despite its impracticality, one may expect this exogenous mechanism to be sequentially
fair. Indeed, this turns out to be the case. However, the class of sequentially fair mechanisms
is far richer than the random-order mechanism. There are some very practical mechanisms
in this class.
We will next characterize all sequentially fair mechanisms in the regular rounds. We will
assume that a mechanism that gives sequential fairness in the sudden-death rounds exists
(and we then show that there are uncountably many such mechanisms).
We introduce a class of mechanisms that will be crucial in our analysis of sequentially
fair mechanisms. A mechanism φ is uneven score symmetric if for all (hk−1; gT1 : gT2)
and (h′ k−1; gT2 : gT1) such that gT1 6= gT2 and k ≤ n, we have φ(hk−1; gT1 : gT2) = 1 −
φ(h′ k−1, gT2 : gT1). That is, as long as the score is not tied at the end of a round, the
probability of who kicks first in the next round is the same for T1 and T2 whenever they
are in each other’s shoes. E.g., when T1 is ahead 3− 2 in (the beginning of) Round 4, and
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when T2 is ahead in Round 4 with a score of 2− 3, in Round 4 T1’s probability of kicking
first in the first case is the same as T2’s probability of kicking first in the second case.
It turns out that such mechanisms fully characterize the sequentially fair mechanisms in
the regular rounds.
Theorem 3 (Sequentially fair mechanisms) Suppose a mechanism φ is sequentially fair
in sudden-death rounds. Then φ is sequentially fair if and only if it is uneven score symmetric
in regular rounds.
The intuition behind this result can be given as follows: When a round starts even,
then the first team’s kicker and the second team’s kicker both exert the same effort and
kick the ball to the same point. This is almost like asserting that when the score is even,
kicking order is of minimum importance. The importance of kicking order, on the other
hand, stems from the fact that when the score is uneven at the beginning of a round, teams
assert different levels of effort in kicking penalties depending on when they kick. Under
an uneven score-symmetric mechanism, each team’s kickers foresee that their team will be
treated symmetrically, as the other team in case either team falls behind or jumps ahead in
score. Therefore, this assurance takes the reason behind the importance of kicking order out
of the equation.
The theorem makes another interesting point. Interestingly, there is only one sequentially
fair exogenous mechanism: The random-order mechanism that determines which team will
kick first with a fair coin toss in a round. We formalize it below, and it follows directly from
Theorem 3.
Proposition 3 Random order is the only exogenous mechanism that is sequentially
fair.
Note that one does not need to treat both teams symmetrically all the time to obtain
sequential fairness. In fact, when the score is tied, it does not matter which team kicks first.
However, when the score is not tied, teams need to be treated symmetrically when the score
is in their favor. This feature opens the door for some interesting practical mechanisms to
be sequentially fair. Two examples of such mechanisms are the ahead-first and behind-
first mechanisms. In ahead-first [behind-first] mechanisms, the team who is ahead [behind]
in score after a round kicks first in the next round, and otherwise the order of the teams
is determined in some predetermined manner. There are also many other uneven-score
symmetric mechanisms in which lotteries play a significant role. For example, a lottery
mechanism that forces the behind team to go first in 75% of the time and T1 to go first 60%
of the time when the score is tied is also sequentially fair.
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7.1 Better Teams Under Sequentially Fair Mechanisms
Uneven-score symmetric mechanisms have another nice feature. Theorem 3 states that when
two teams have the same kicking ability, they have equal winning probability. What if one
team is better than the other? Suppose there is one player who has a better kicking ability
than the rest of the players, i.e., the player has a higher PG(x) and a lower PO(x) for every
x ∈ [0, 1]. We formally define a better player as follows: Let {PG, PO} represent all players’
kicking ability except the better player, and {P˜G, P˜O} represent the better player’s kicking
ability. We assume (a) PG(x) < P˜G(x) and PO(x) > P˜O(x), and (b)
P ′G(x)
P˜ ′G(x)
=
P ′O(x)
P˜ ′O(x)
for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. We show that the team with this better player – now named the better team –
has a higher winning probability under uneven-score symmetric mechanisms.
Theorem 4 Suppose a mechanism that is sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds and
uneven-score symmetric in regular rounds is used in the shootout. Then a better team has a
higher ex ante chance of winning at the unique state-symmetric equilibrium of the shootout
induced by this mechanism, if the better player is used strategically in the best kicking order
possible by the better team.
Therefore, sequentially fair mechanisms satisfy the Aristotelean Justice criterion accord-
ing to the definition of better/worse teams above.
7.2 Sequential Fairness in Sudden-Death Rounds
The class of sequentially fair mechanisms is larger when sudden-death rounds are also con-
sidered.
First we introduce a practical sequentially fair mechanism for the sudden-death rounds.
As we concluded in the previous section, the fixed-order mechanism clearly fails sequential
fairness in the sudden-death rounds. So is there a simple and deterministic mechanism that is
sequentially fair in the sudden-death rounds? The answer is affirmative, and the alternating-
order mechanism is sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds, although it is not in regular
rounds. The intuition is straightforward: Under the alternating-order mechanism, one can
have uneven scores, such as T1 being ahead, in an intermediate regular round. Hence, it
cannot satisfy uneven-score symmetry as required in a sequentially fair mechanism. On the
other hand, in the sudden-death rounds, the score is never uneven at the beginning of a
round. Hence, the exogeneity of the alternating order does not prevent sequential fairness.
Theorem 5 The alternating-order mechanism is sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds.
The intuition behind this result and its relationship to Theorem 1 about the multiplicity
of equilibria in the fixed-order can be given as follows: All mechanisms span an infinite game
23
in the sudden-death rounds. Typically this gives rise to multiplicity of equilibria. However,
we are interested in state-symmetric equilibria for sequential fairness. In the fixed-order
game, not all histories and information sets are reached in the path of the shootout, since
fixed-order always dictates the same team to kick first. That is, two teams are “never in
each other’s shoes” during sudden-death rounds. Hence, the game has total freedom to
choose among many different equilibria, i.e., the rounds that dictate that T2 kicks first are
never reached and have no restrictions on the equilibrium behavior. On the other hand,
the alternating-order mechanism is just the opposite in that sense: both teams are “in each
other’s shoes” in every other round. This puts more restrictions on the state-symmetric
equilibria, and only the 50%-50% winning equilibria survive state-symmetry.
Actually, for such a restriction to hold, we do not even need the teams to be “in each
other’s shoes” as frequently as in the alternating-order mechanism. In fact, there are un-
countably many other mechanisms that are sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds:
Theorem 6 Take any mechanism φ that is uneven score symmetric in regular rounds, and
any sequentially fair mechanism ϕ in sudden-death rounds. Construct a mechanism ψ such
that for a given Sudden-death Round k, for all ` such that n < ` < k and feasible scores
gT1 : gT2, and beginning of Round ` kicking orders h
`−1, ψ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2) = φ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2)
and for all ` ≥ k and ` ≤ n and feasible scores gT1 : gT2 and beginning of Round ` kicking
orders h`−1, ψ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2) = ϕ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2). Then ψ is sequentially fair.
That is, we can replace the continuation of any uneven-score symmetric mechanism after
some sudden-death round with a sequentially fair mechanism in sudden-death rounds (i.e.,
such as with the alternating-order mechanism), and regardless of initial part of the mech-
anism, the newly constructed mechanism becomes sequentially fair. The intuition of this
result is as follows: Take the last round before sequential fairness kicks in, say Round k. By
backward induction, as teams are tied at the beginning of Round k and in Round k+ 1 they
have a 50%− 50% chance of winning, in all situations the two kickers of Round k exert the
same effort regardless of kicking order (as we explained in the intuition behind Theorem 3).
Therefore, at the beginning of Round k, both teams have an equal chance of winning as well.
An example of such a mechanism is a behind-first mechanism such that in the first n + 10
rounds T1 kicks first whenever the game is tied, and then we alternate the order. Note that
in the first 10 sudden-death rounds T1 kicks first, and yet, the mechanism is sequentially
fair as it is appended by a sequentially fair mechanism in sudden-death rounds, namely the
alternating-order mechanism.
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8 Market Design and Practical Criteria
Sequential fairness is capable of ruling out many mechanisms in regular rounds, including the
fixed-order mechanism currently used worldwide. Interestingly, it also rules out a seemingly
fair exogenous mechanism, namely the alternating-order mechanism. Nevertheless, a case
could easily be made for that mechanism over the lone sequentially fair exogenous mecha-
nism, i.e., over the random mechanism, especially in the sudden-death rounds. In terms of
endogenous mechanisms, however, sequential fairness does not pose as much of a restriction.
In any such mechanism, when the score is even at the end of a round, it does not matter
which team kicks first in the next round. In addition, when the score is not even at the end
of a round, as long as the same probability is used in determining which team will kick first,
whether the winning team or the losing team kicks first does not matter either. Thus, one
needs further desirable properties to help refine the set of sequentially fair mechanisms. We
will next define additional criteria to provide concrete practical advice in that regard. We
start with an efficiency argument.
8.1 Efficiency and Behind-First Mechanisms
It is not difficult to argue that requiring the maximum effort possible in terms of aiming at
the optimal spot (by taking the right amount of risk of kicking the ball out) is a desirable
property. This is because most soccer fans would want to see kickers aim at the optimal spot
as much as possible, leading to higher penalty shootout scores if not to simply higher-quality
kicks. Thus, a crucial question is “does one of the sequentially fair mechanisms have an
advantage over others in terms of the effort level of kickers and thus goal efficiency?” We use
the following property at equilibrium to introduce a powerful efficiency notion.
Dominance in goal production and effort: Mechanism φ dominates mechanism φ′ in
terms of goal production and effort if for any two state-symmetric equilibria of φ and φ′,
(X,µ) and (X ′, µ′), respectively, we have Xr,Tk(H) ≥ X ′r,T `(H ′) (and hence, PG(Xr,Tk(H)) ≥
PG(X
′
r,T `(H
′))) for any two information sets H ∈ Hr,Tk and H ′ ∈ Hr,T ` pertaining to the
same Regular Round r ≤ n and the same kicking order, 1st or 2nd, such that the score
difference between T1 and T2 in H, s, and in H ′, s′, satisfy s =
{ s′ if T` = Tk
−s′ if T` 6= Tk , and
the inequality is strict for at least one information set.
This means that given a state of the information sets reachable under both φ and φ′, the
kicker who kicks at that state will exert (weakly) more effort under φ than the kicker who
kicks at the same state under φ′. Hereafter, we will refer to this property as goal dominance.
We now turn our attention to which mechanisms are dominant among sequentially fair
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mechanisms. We define a subclass of sequentially fair mechanisms to address this issue:
Behind-first mechanisms: In regular rounds, the team that is behind after Round r < n
kicks first at Round r + 1; when the score is even after Round r, any (random or fixed,
exogenous or endogenous) order is admissible at Round r + 1. In sudden-death rounds, any
mechanism that is sequentially fair in sudden-death rounds can be used.
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 7 A mechanism is goal-dominant among sequentially fair mechanisms if and
only if it is behind first.
The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. Consider the other se-
quentially fair extreme of behind first, the ahead-first mechanisms. By backward induction,
first observe that ahead-first and behind-first cannot be compared with each other in Round
n = 2 whenever the score is not tied: in ahead first when the score difference is s > 0, T1
kicks first, and when the score difference is s < 0, T2 kicks first, while it is just the opposite
for behind first. So there are no two comparable information sets, as in the definition of the
dominance property, that are reached with positive probability under both mechanisms. On
the other hand, when the score is tied, all uneven-score symmetric mechanisms lead to the
same goal efforts and are equivalent in Round n = 2 in terms of goal dominance.
Therefore, the difference between the two mechanism subclasses boils down to the Round
1 kickers’ behavior. To analyze that, first we summarize the incentives facing Round 2 kickers.
In Round 2, kicking first is not good at all for goal-production incentives: the first-kicking
team’s player (if his team is either behind or ahead) will always exert less effort than he
would in the case when he kicks second in Round 2. This is true because his marginal
contribution will be less in the first case, as the other team’s kicker – who will go second –
can always miss and overcome the first kicker’s failure. So he has higher incentives to shirk
when he kicks first.
Now, we turn our attention to Round 1 kickers’ marginal contributions under both mecha-
nisms. First, observe that both teams’ kickers under any uneven-score symmetric mechanism
exert the same effort in Round 1, from our previous analysis. Therefore, understanding the
first-kicking team player’s incentives is sufficient to draw the difference between the two
mechanisms regardless of the kicking order or score during Round 1. A first-round kicker,
if he does not exert high effort under behind first, may cause his team to fall behind with
higher probability. This causes his teammate to shirk more, when he goes first, and the other
team’s second player to exert higher effort, when he goes second in Round 2. On the other
hand, under ahead first, the first-round kicker’s incentives are exactly the opposite! If he
does not exert high effort in Round 1, his team may fall behind with higher probability, but
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his teammate will exert relatively higher effort under ahead first by going second in Round
2 (with respect to behind first) and the other team’s second kicker will exert less effort in
Round 2 (with respect to behind first). Hence, the first-round kicker’s possible failure can
still be salvaged with higher probability under ahead first. So he shirks under ahead first
with respect to behind first. Therefore, behind first dominates any random (i.e., convex com-
bination of ahead first and behind first) and ahead-first mechanism among all uneven-score
symmetric mechanisms.
Behind-first mechanisms have also another natural motivation. One concern we might
have is whether a mechanism could increase score rectifiability for the team that is behind
in score. Consider the following axiom, which behind-first mechanisms satisfy:
Instant rectifiability: Whenever any Tk is behind in score after Round r, T` should
obtain with probability one the chance to make the score discrepancy smaller before Tk
(where k 6= `) can obtain a chance to make the score discrepancy larger in Round r + 1.
Thus, instant rectifiability means that the team that is behind gets a chance to catch
up with the team that is ahead as soon as possible, before a larger score deficit may arise.
Without instant rectifiability, a larger score deficit may put the losing team in a more non-
rectifiable position, especially as the end of the shootout nears. We have the following
observation:
Observation 1 Behind-first mechanisms are the only sequentially fair mechanisms that sat-
isfy instant rectifiability.
Observe that instant rectifiability also has implications for the probability that all regular-
round penalty shots are taken by kickers. To see that, suppose that n = 2 and the score
is 1 − 0 after the first round. Consider the fixed-order mechanism. Suppose that T1’s last
kicker scores in Round 2; then there is no need for T2’s last kicker to kick in Round 2.
Observe that this is an event with a probability of more than 1
2
by assumption. Thus, with
a high probability, T2’s last kicker will make no contribution. Only in the case where T1’s
last kicker misses, i.e., with a probability less than 1
2
by assumption, will T2’s last kicker’s
kick be needed by his team. Now, again with the 1− 0 score after the first round, consider
instead any mechanism that satisfies instant rectifiability. Suppose T2’s last kicker scores
(which, again, is a more-than-1
2
-probability event by assumption); then T1’s last kicker will
get to kick. Only in the case that T2’s last kicker misses, i.e., with a probability of less
than 1
2
, will T1’s last kicker’s kick no longer be needed. Thus, instant rectifiability will also
increase the overall probability that all regular penalty shots are taken.
Thus, we have the following remark:
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Remark 1 Suppose n = 2. Conditional on reaching a state of 1 − 0 score led by T1, the
probability of all kickers using their kicks is higher in behind-first mechanisms than that in
non-behind-first mechanisms.
8.2 Alternating-Order Mechanisms and Sequential Fairness
Although behind-first mechanisms have nice features when the score is uneven, as mentioned
before they are silent on how to define the kicking order when the score is tied. Sequential
fairness in regular rounds, by our characterization in Theorem 3, is also mute on this issue,
but reversing the kicking order is a sure way of establishing sequential fairness in sudden-
death rounds (Theorem 5).
The alternating-order mechanism, which is not sequentially fair in regular rounds since
it does not satisfy uneven score symmetry, does possess a nice property, at least when the
score is tied in most crucial rounds, i.e., in sudden-death rounds: namely, it gives both teams
an equality of opportunity in sudden-death rounds. Clearly, such an equality-of-opportunity
property is nowhere more important than in sudden-death rounds in which the score must
be tied before every round.
The alternating-order mechanism is also used in tiebreak-serve patterns in tennis and
has been popular since its inception. We would like to preserve the equality-of-opportunity
feature of this mechanism, especially in sudden-death rounds. The behind-first mechanism
defined below has this feature.
The alternating-order behind-first mechanism: The team that is behind in score after
any Round r kicks first at Round r + 1. If the score is tied after Round r, then the team
that kicked second at Round r kicks first in Round r + 1.21
Besides its simplicity, this mechanism possesses several nice features. We will start with
sudden-death equality of opportunity. This property would emerge naturally since a simple
but strong case could be easily made against the same team kicking multiple times in a row
in those rounds in a lop-sided fashion:
Sudden-death equality of opportunity: Whenever the shootout ends after the Sudden-
death Round n + r with r even, each team will have kicked first exactly r/2 times in the
sudden-death rounds.
Then we have the following corollary:
21We are agnostic about how the first round order is determined in the definition of the mechanism. It
can be determined in any manner. However, in practice we suggest it be determined by a fair coin toss as
in the current fixed-order mechanism.
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Corollary 2 The alternating-order behind-first mechanism satisfies sudden-death equal-
ity of opportunity.
Another justification of alternating-order behind-first mechanisms is as follows: Eclectic
mechanisms could be confusing for players, coaches, referees, and fans. One can combine
a sequentially fair mechanism in regular rounds with another sequentially fair mechanism
in sudden-death rounds in an eclectic fashion to come up with an overall sequentially fair
mechanism. For example, consider the following mechanism in regular rounds coupled with
the alternating-order mechanism in sudden-death rounds: T1 kicks first in Round r as long
as the score is tied or T1 is behind in Round r − 1 ; once T2 falls behind after some Round
r′ > r, T2 kicks first until T1 falls behind in score after some Round r′′ > r′, after which
T1 kicks first. One can improve on such a patchy mechanism by requiring that such an
eclecticism should be eliminated. We will introduce two axioms such that the latter uses the
former in its definition to formalize this intuition of simplicity. Before introducing the first
axiom, we formally introduce how an order pattern can be recognized in a mechanism:
A finite machine representation of a mechanism is a triple (Q,A, t) such that
• Q is a finite set of (machine) states such that state q = (Tk)w ∈ Q denotes that team
Tk taking the first penalty shot in the round associated with this state and w is just
an index number. Thus, Q can be partitioned into two as QT1 = {(T1)1, ..., (T1)w1}
and QT2 = {(T21, ..., (T2)w2} for some w1 and w2 as the sets of states in which team
T1 and T2 kick first, respectively.
• A = {(g1 : g2)} is the set of possible scores.
• t : Q ∪ {∅} × A × Q → [0, 1] is a state transition probability function such that∑
q′∈Q t(q, (g1 : g2), q
′) = 1 for all q ∈ Q ∪ {∅} and (g1 : g2) ∈ A. Here, t(q, (g1 : g2), q′)
is the probability of moving from state q to state q′ when after round associated with
q is played and the score is g1 : g2 just before q
′ and after q.
We refer to null state ∅, as the start of the shootout. In this representation, we
envision that each machine state is associated with a round of penalty kicks taken by each
team consecutively. However, as round numbers proceed, the game will have to come back to
some previous machine state, as the set of states is finite whereas a game can last arbitrarily
long in theory.
A mechanism φ is said to have finite machine representation (Q,A, t), if (1) t(∅, (0 :
0), (T1)1) = φ(∅, 0 : 0) and t(∅, (0 : 0), (T2)1) = 1 − φ(∅, 0 : 0); and (2) recursively, for
any kicking-order history hr−1 at the beginning of Round r, and feasible score gT1 : gT2 at
the beginning of Round r, if the associated machine state with round r − 1 was q ∈ Q,
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then we have t(q, (gT1 : gT2), (T1)w) = φ(h
r−1, gT1 : gT2) for some state (T1)w ∈ QT1 and
t(q, (gT1 : gT2), (T2)w) = 1 − φ(hr−1, gT1 : gT2) for some state (T2)w ∈ QT2; and once a
transition occurs to a state q′ from q, ex post we refer to q′ as the machine state associated
with round r.
Note that a machine representation does not specify when the shootout game ends, as
no round information is kept in the machine representation. It only keeps track of how
transitions are made between different kicking orders in a well-defined pattern. We are
ready to introduce our next axiom:
Stationarity: A mechanism is stationary if it has a finite machine representation (Q,A, t)
such that for all states qi ∈ Q∪ {∅} and qj ∈ Q, t(qi, (gT1 : gT2), qj) = t(qi, (g′T1 : g′T2), qj) for
all scores such that gT1 − gT2 = g′T1 − g′T2.
Thus, stationarity implies that state transitions are made in the same manner whenever
score differences are the same.
For example, the alternating-order behind-first mechanism has this type of a representa-
tion as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The state transition representation for the alternating-order behind-first mecha-
nism. Transitions from the start of the shootout are omitted for simplicity. In general one
of the two states in the figure will be chosen randomly with an unbiased lottery.
We state the following proposition whose proof is given in the figure:
Proposition 4 The alternating-order behind-first mechanism is stationary.
Machine representations can be used to measure the complexity of an algorithm.22 How-
ever, very complicated mechanisms can also be stationary. We consider a modified Prouhet-
Thue-Morse behind-first mechanism. First we define the fractal Prouhet-Thue-Morse mech-
anism (cf. Palacios-Huerta, 2014): The kicking order proceeds in an exogenous manner as
follows: T1−T2−T2−T1−T2−T1−T1−T2−... i.e. the order sequence since the beginning
of the shootout reverses after 2k rounds for each k = 1, 2, .... We define the following modified
22For example, in game theory, they are used to represent the recall requirement needed for implementing
a repeated game strategy (cf. Rubinstein, 1998, for an excellent survey).
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Prouhet-Thue-Morse behind-first mechanism: If one team is behind, it kicks first; otherwise,
at even scores the first-kicking team follows the sequence T1−T2−T2−T1−T2−T1−T1−T2;
then this sequence reverses starting with T2 and keeps reversing until the shootout ends.
Any behind-first mechanism compatible with a Prouhet-Thue-Morse order is stationary, and
the simplest stationary machine representation of such a mechanism cannot have fewer than
|Q| = 16 states.23 On the other hand, if we would like to have a chance of both teams
kicking first in at least one round, we need at least two states, one T1-kicking-first state and
one T2-kicking-first state. Thus, |Q| = 2 is the minimum we can hope for in a reasonable
mechanism. Indeed, the current (fixed-order) mechanism has |Q| = 2, as according to the
initial coin toss, either team can go first. However, it is not sequentially fair. The random-
order mechanism has also |Q| = 2 and is sequentially fair (but not goal-dominant). Our
behind-first alternating-order mechanism also has this property (cf. Figure 2). We formalize
this axiom as follows:
Simplicity: A mechanism is simple if it has a stationary machine representation with only
two states such that in one state T1 kicks first and in the other T2 kicks first.
Another example of a stationary behind-first mechanism that does not satisfy simplicity
is as follows: Consider the following twist in our alternating-order behind-first mechanism.
Instead of teams switching order whenever the score is tied, let’s reinforce an explicit sequence
of kicking first as T1 − T2 − T1 − T2, etc.; that is, the team that kicked first last time
when the score is even now kicks last. This mechanism is stationary; however, it is not
simple. Its representation in Figure 3 has four states, and we cannot find another stationary
representation with fewer states.
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Figure 3: The state transition representation for the modified alternating-order behind-first
mechanism. Transitions from the start of the shootout are omitted for simplicity. In general
(T1)1 or (T2)1 will be chosen randomly as the initial state with an unbiased lottery.
23On the other hand, the truly fractal Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence is not stationary.
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An important motivation for simplicity stems from the FIFA soccer rules. These rules
state that a rule violation by the referees during a game necessitates replay of the game.
Shootout mechanisms that satisfy the simplicity axiom will make the process easier to ad-
minister for the referees and will make the process less prone to rule violations. We see
simplicity as a vital requirement of a real-life shootout mechanism. The current mecha-
nism satisfies simplicity but none of the other properties we have introduced in this paper.
Our mechanism also satisfies simplicity, along with all the other important properties. We
formalize the simplicity of the alternating-order behind-first mechanism with the following
proposition. We gave its proof earlier:
Proposition 5 The alternating-order behind-first mechanism is simple.
We state the main result of this section as follows:
Theorem 8 Alternating order behind first is the unique goal-dominant sequen-
tially fair mechanism that satisfies simplicity and sudden-death equality of oppor-
tunity.
Moreover, this theorem and our earlier Observation 1 about behind-first mechanisms lead
to the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Alternating order behind first is the unique sequentially fair mecha-
nism that satisfies instant rectifiability, simplicity, and sudden-death equality of
opportunity.
We next demonstrate the independence of properties in Theorem 8: A sequentially
fair mechanism that satisfies all axioms but violates the goal-dominance property is the
alternating-order ahead-first mechanism. A sequentially fair mechanism that satisfies all
properties but the sudden-death equality of opportunity is a behind-first mechanism, which
randomly determines with an even lottery who goes first when the score is tied. A sequen-
tially fair mechanism that satisfies all properties but is not simple is a Prouhet-Thue-Morse
behind-first mechanism.
Finally, given that soccer is part of the entertainment sector, we will elaborate on the
relevance of the criteria considered in this section in that respect. Dominance’s implication
regarding goal efficiency is already embraced by fans’ desire to see more goals or at least
higher-quality penalty kicks in a match, including the shootout. Instant rectifiability will
help make the penalty score closer, which should be preferred to the current non-rectifiability
of a score gap in a shootout. Simplicity will make the process easier to follow for the fans
and players and easier to administer for the referees. Sequential fairness and sudden-death
equality of opportunity will make the process fairer such that it would be harder to dispute
the legitimacy of the winner of the shootout.
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9 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Like the current fixed-order shootout mechanism in soccer, some sequential tournaments may
be conducive to a first-mover advantage, which may impede the efficiency and/or fairness of
these tournaments.24 Further analysis of related specific exogenous and endogenous tiebreak
mechanisms may be modified to design new tournament structures with more desirable
efficiency or fairness characteristics in these other real-life tournaments as well.
Also note that our behind-first mechanisms and the additional criteria or properties we
have considered here can be of help in sports competitions other than soccer. For example,
ice hockey and field hockey, as well as water polo, handball, cricket, and rugby, also have
tiebreak or penalty shootout mechanisms the same as or similar to that of soccer, and thus
can benefit from our properties.
A relevant question would be whether any of these properties are already being used
in real life and how successful they are in their domains. In that regard, we will first give
examples from player draft mechanisms in North American major sports and then from
the age-old game Petanque (a.k.a. Boules or Bocce). First, note that all of the sequential
player draft mechanisms in major professional leagues in the US such as the National Foot-
ball League, the National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, and the National
Hockey League can be considered special cases of behind-first mechanisms in that domain,
where the more disadvantaged teams (in terms of their league records from the previous
season) go ahead first and pick better players before less disadvantaged teams. This feature
is credited widely with the competitive balance of North American major sports.
Perhaps the behind-first property is nowhere more blatant and effectively at work than in
the rules of “Petanque,” which was invented in ancient times by the Greeks, later modified
by Romans, and is now popular in various parts of the world including France and Italy -
and currently expanding. In this game, the goal is to throw metal or wooden balls (boules)
as close as possible to a small special wooden target, while standing inside a small starting
circle. The rules are as follows: A player from the team that threw (and established) the
target also throws the first ball. Then a player from the other team throws the second
ball. The team with the ball that is closest to the target is said to “have the point” or
“be winning” and other team is “losing.” Then the “losing” team gets to throw the next
ball.25 Thus, in essence, just like our behind-first mechanisms, petanque too intends to give
the “losing” team a chance to recover. Further, if the two balls closest to the target are
from opposing teams and equidistant, teams play alternately until one team becomes the
24See Fudenberg et al (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985) for sequential patent race models.
25See Article 15 of the world governing body of Petanque’s, FIPJP’s, official rulebook at
http://www.fipjp.com/en/rules-texts-downloads.
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“winning” team and the other one the “losing” team.26
A Appendix: Proofs of the Results in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 1. First observe that x solves Equation 4 when UO = 0. As the
partial derivative w.r.t. UO on the (left-hand side of) first-order condition is P
′
O(x
∗
`) > 0,
the implicit function theorem implies that x∗` < x. Moreover, as the partial derivative w.r.t.
WG,` −WNG,` on the first-order condition is P ′G(x∗`) > 0 (as x∗` < x), the implicit function
theorem again implies that the higher the expected marginal contribution, WG,` −WNG,`,
the higher is x∗` ; and the higher is PG(x
∗
`).
Proof of Theorem 1. We drop “*” superscripts for convenience. We write the three
first-order conditions using Equation 11 (or 3) as:
P ′G(x)[PG(yB)VT1 + (1− PG(yB))VW − PG(yE)VL − (1− PG(yE))VT1 + UG] + P ′O(x)UO = 0
P ′G(yB)[VT2 − VL + UG] + P ′O(yB)UO = 0
P ′G(yE)[VW − VT2 + UG] + P ′O(yE)UO = 0
We first prove that x = yE.
Claim 1. x = yE.
Proof of Claim 1. Define
∆ = PG(yB)VT1 + (1− PG(yB))VW − PG(yE)VL − [1− PG(yE)]VT1 − VW + VT2.
From the first-order conditions of x and yE, x ≥ yE if and only if ∆ ≥ 0. Recall that the
winning probability of T1 in equilibrium, α is given in Equation 13. Hence,
∆ = PG(yB)(VT1 − VW ) + PG(yE)(VT1 − VL) + VT2 − VT1
= PG(yB)(1− α)(VL − VW ) + PG(yE)α(VW − VL) + (1− 2α)(VW − VL)
= [−PG(yB)(1− α) + PG(yE)α + 1− 2α](VW − VL)
= [1− PG(yB) + (PG(yE) + PG(yB)− 2)α](VW − VL)
26See Article 28 of the FIPJP’s official rulebook.
34
We substitute α from Equation 13 as follows:
∆ = [1− PG(yB) + (PG(yE) + PG(yB)− 2) PG(x)(1− PG(yB))
PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE) ](VW − VL)
= (1− PG(yB))[1 + (PG(yE) + PG(yB)− 2)PG(x)
PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE) ](VW − VL)
=
[
(1− PG(yB))(VW − VL)
PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE)
]
× [PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE) + (PG(yE) + PG(yB)− 2)PG(x)]
=
(1− PG(yB))(VW − VL)
PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE) [PG(yE)− PG(x)]
Suppose x > yE, then as both x, yE < x and PG is increasing on the left of x, we have
PG(x) > PG(yE). But then ∆ < 0, contradicting that x > yE. Supposition x < yE leads to
a similar contradiction. Therefore, we must have x = yE. ♦
Given x = yE, α can be simplified as
α =
PG(x)(1− PG(yB))
PG(x)(1− PG(yB)) + (1− PG(x))PG(yE) =
1− PG(yB)
2− PG(yB)− PG(yE) ,
and α = 1
2
iff x = yB. Then the first-order condition w.r.t. yB can be simplified as:
P ′G(yB)[VT2 − VL + UG] + P ′O(yB)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(yB)[(1− α)(VW − VL) + UG] + P ′O(yB)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(yB)[(VW − VL)
1− PG(yE)
2− PG(yB)− PG(yE) + UG] + P
′
O(yB)UO = 0 (16)
Similarly, the first-order condition w.r.t. yE can be simplified as:
P ′G(yE)[VW − VT2 + UG] + P ′O(yE)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(yE)[α(VW − VL) + UG] + P ′O(yE)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(yE)[(VW − VL)
1− PG(yB)
2− PG(yB)− PG(yE) + UG] + P
′
O(yE)UO = 0 (17)
Now we are ready to prove part (i). First we show that P ′G(0)[
VW−VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(0)UO ≥ 0
implies the existence of equilibrium. Define H(z) ≡ P ′G(z)[VW−VL2 + UG] + P ′O(z)UO. H(z)
is continuous with H ′(z) < 0 as P ′′G(z) < 0 and P
′′
O(z) ≥ 0. Then H(0) = P ′G(0)[VW−VL2 +
UG] + P
′
O(0)UO ≥ 0 and H(x) = P ′O(x)UO < 0 implies that there exists some a ∈ [0, x) such
that H(a) = 0. It can readily be seen that (x, yB, yE) = (a, a, a) solves the two first-order
conditions and hence constitutes an equilibrium.
On the other hand, assume now P ′G(0)[
VW−VL
2
+UG]+P
′
O(0)UO = H(0) < 0. As H
′(z) < 0,
H(z) < 0 for every z ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium
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(x, yB, yE). Clearly yB 6= yE, for otherwise 1−PG(yE)2−PG(yB)−PG(yE) = 12 and the first-order condition
of yB becomes H(yB) < 0. Suppose yB > yE. Then the first-order condition w.r.t. yE in
Equation 17 becomes:
P ′G(yE)[(VW − VL)
1− PG(yB)
2− PG(yB)− PG(yE) + UG] + P
′
O(yE)UO
< P ′G(yE)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(yE)UO = H(yE) < 0,
a contradiction! Then yB < yE; and similarly, the first-order condition for yB is negative,
leading to a contradiction. Therefore, an equilibrium exists if and only if P ′G[
VW−VL
2
+UG] +
P ′O(0)UO = H(0) ≥ 0.
There may be multiple solutions (yE, yB), and whenever one exists, then (yˆE, yˆB) satis-
fying yˆE = yB and yˆB = yE also lead to a state-symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. The first-order conditions are given by Equations 16 and 17
for yB and yE in the proof of Theorem 1, respectively (dropping the superscript “∗”). We
get yB = y(β) and yE = y(1− β), since f = P ′G/P ′O is an invertible differentiable decreasing
function in the region [0, x¯] by assumption that PO is convex and increasing and PG is strictly
concave and increasing in the interval [0, x¯]. Thus, circularly, plugging in yB and yE, we get
Equation 15. Optimal spots yB and x = yE are multiple valued if and only if β is multiple
valued. β = 1
2
always solves Equation 15, and if β = α is a solution then β = 1− α is also a
solution. Thus, there is an odd number of solutions.
Proof of Theorem 3. We solve it by backward induction. As both teams have an equal
chance of winning in sudden-death rounds, the value function is VW+VL
2
for each team at the
end of the regular rounds.
Second Round, Second Kick
Whether the last-kicking team is currently even or behind, it can readily be verified
that the optimal kicking strategy is always ξ < x, where ξ is determined by the following
first-order condition:
P ′G(ξ)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(ξ)UO = 0
Second Round, First Kick
Next we look at the optimal kicking strategy for the first-kicking team in Round 2.
Consider two cases:
When T2 kicks first in Round 2
There are three possible states: when the score is currently even, when T2 is currently
behind (by one goal), and when T2 is currently ahead (by one goal).
When the score is currently even Let y2E denote the optimal kicking strategy for
T2′s kicker in Round 2 when the score is even. The value function for T2 is
VT2,P2,E = (PG(y2E)PG(ξ)+(1−PG(y2E))(1−PG(ξ)))VW + VL
2
+PG(y2E)(1−PG(ξ))VW+(1−PG(y2E))PG(ξ)VL
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By Equation 11, y2E solves the following first-order condition:
P ′G(y2E)[(PG(ξ)− (1− PG(ξ)))
VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(ξ))VW − PG(ξ)VL + UG] + P ′O(y2E)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(y2E)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(y2E)UO = 0
Therefore y2E = ξ and VT2,P2,E =
VW+VL
2
.
When T2 is currently behind Let y2B denote the optimal kicking strategy for T2
′s
kicker in Round 2 when the score is currently behind. The value function for T2 is
VT2,P2,B = PG(y2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(y2B))VL
y2B satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(y2B)[PG(ξ)VL + (1− PG(ξ))
VW + VL
2
− VL + UG] + P ′O(y2B)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(y2B)[(1− PG(ξ))
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(y2B)UO = 0
When T2 is currently ahead Let y2A denote the optimal kicking strategy for T2
′s kicker
in Round 2 when the score is currently ahead. The value function for T2 is
VT2,P2,A = PG(y2A)VW + (1− PG(y2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
The optimal kicking strategy, y2A, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(y2A)[VW − (1− PG(ξ))VW − PG(ξ)
VW + VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(y2A)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(y2A)[PG(ξ)
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(y2A)UO = 0
As PG(ξ) >
1
2
, y2A > y2B.
When T1 kicks first in Round 2
Let x2E, x2B, and x2A denote the optimal kicking strategy for T1
′s kicker in Round 2
when the score is even, when T1 is behind, and when T1 is ahead respectively. By symmetry,
we have the following results:
When the score is currently even
The optimal kicking strategy is x2E = y2E = ξ, and the value function for T1 is VT1,P2,E =
VW+VL
2
.
When T1 is currently behind
The optimal kicking strategy is x2B = y2B < ξ, and the value function for T1 is
VT1,P2,B = PG(x2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x2B))VL
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When T1 is currently ahead
The optimal kicking strategy is x2A = y2A < ξ, and the value function for T1 is
VT1,P2,A = PG(x2A)VW + (1− PG(x2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
First Round, Second Kick
Next we study the second team’s optimal kicking strategy in Round 1. There are two
possible states:
When T1 does not score in Round 1
The value function for T2 in this case is
VT2,P1,E = PG(y1E)[φ(T1; 0 : 1)(VW+VL−VT1,P2,B)+(1−φ(T1; 0 : 1))VT2,P2,A]+(1−PG(y1E))VW + VL
2
,
where
VT1,P2,B = PG(x2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x2B))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− [1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))]VW − VL
2
VT2,P2,A = PG(y2A)VW + (1− PG(y2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]VW − VL
2
We substitute the equations of VT1,P2,B and VT2,P2,A into VT2,P1,E as follows:
VT2,P1,E =
VW + VL
2
+ PG(y1E){φ(T1; 0 : 1)[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
+(1− φ(T1; 0 : 1))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]}VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, y1E, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(y1E){α1
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(y1E)UO = 0, where
α1 = φ(T1; 0 : 1)[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)].
When T1 scores in Round 1, the value function for T2 is
VT2,P1,B = PG(y1B)
VW + VL
2
+(1−PG(y1B))[(1−φ(T1; 1 : 0))VT2,P2,B+φ(T1; 1 : 0)(VW+VL−VT1,P2,A)],
where
VT2,P2,B = PG(y2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(y2B))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− [1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))]VW − VL
2
VT1,P2,A = PG(x2A)VW + (1− PG(x2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]VW − VL
2
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We substitute the equations of VT2,P2,B and VT1,P2,A into VT2,P1,B as follows:
VT2,P1,B =
VW + VL
2
− (1− PG(y1B))[(1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
+φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]]VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, y1B, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(y1B){α2
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(y1B)UO = 0, where
α2 = (1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]
Then y1B = y1E iff α1 = α2 iff
φ(T1; 0 : 1)[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]]
= (1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]
⇐⇒ (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1)− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]
= (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1)− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
⇐⇒ (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1)− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[(1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))] = 0
However, (1 − PG(y2A))PG(ξ) − PG(x2B)(1 − PG(ξ)) > 0 as x > ξ > x2B and y2A < ξ.
Accordingly, y1B = y1E if and only if φ(T1; 0 : 1) + φ(T1; 1 : 0) = 1.
First Round, First Kick
Finally, we solve for T1’s optimal kicking strategy in Round 1. The value function for
T1 is
VT1 = PG(x1)[VW + VL − VT2,P1,B] + (1− PG(x1))[VW + VL − VT2,P1,E]
= VW + VL − PG(x1)VT2,P1,B − (1− PG(x1))VT2,P1,E
We substitute the equations of VT2,P1,B and VT2,P1,E into VT1 as follows:
VT1 =
VW + VL
2
+ [PG(x1)(1− PG(y1B))α2 − (1− PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1]VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, x1, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1){[(1− PG(y1B))α2 + PG(y1E)α1]
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1)UO = 0
Therefore
x1 R y1E ⇐⇒ (1− PG(y1B))α2 R (1− PG(y1E))α1
On the other hand, we have
VT1 =
VW + VL
2
⇐⇒ PG(x1)(1− PG(y1B))α2 = (1− PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1
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Given that both teams have an equal chance of winning in sudden-death rounds and
VT2,P2,E = VT1,P2,E =
VW+VL
2
, φ is sequentially fair if and only if VT1 =
VW+VL
2
. We first make
the following claim:
Claim 1 PG(x1)(1−PG(y1B))α2 = (1−PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1 if and only if (1−PG(y1B))α2 =
(1− PG(y1E))α1.
Proof of Claim 1
(i) PG(x1)(1 − PG(y1B))α2 = (1 − PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1 implies (1 − PG(y1B))α2 = (1 −
PG(y1E))α1.
Suppose to the contrary that (1 − PG(y1B))α2 6= (1 − PG(y1E))α1 but PG(x1)(1 −
PG(y1B))α2 = (1 − PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1. If (1 − PG(y1B))α2 > (1 − PG(y1E))α1, then from
the first-order condition of x1 we have x > x1 > y1E. Then PG(x1)(1 − PG(y1B))α2 >
PG(y1E)(1 − PG(y1B))α2 > PG(y1E)(1 − PG(y1E))α1 > (1 − PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1, a contradic-
tion. The other case can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
(ii) (1 − PG(y1B))α2 = (1 − PG(y1E))α1 implies PG(x1)(1 − PG(y1B))α2 = (1 −
PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1.
If (1− PG(y1B))α2 = (1− PG(y1E))α1, then from the first-order condition of x1 we have
x1 = y1E, which in turn implies
PG(x1)(1−PG(y1B))α2 = PG(y1E)(1−PG(y1B))α2 = PG(y1E)(1−PG(y1E))α1 = (1−PG(x1))PG(y1E)α1
Hence the Claim is established. ♦
Accordingly, φ is sequentially fair if and only if (1 − PG(y1B))α2 = (1 − PG(y1E))α1.
This equality holds for an arbitrary pair of (feasible) probabilities, {PG, PO}, if and only if
α1 = α2, which holds if and only if φ(T1; 0 : 1) + φ(T1; 1 : 0) = 1, i.e., φ is uneven score
symmetric.
Proof of Theorem 4. We show that by putting the better player in the first round, the
better team has a higher chance of winning under an uneven-score symmetric mechanism.
Consider two subcases:
(i) When the better player is in T2.
Since the better player is placed in the first round, the second-round maximization prob-
lems remain unchanged. Following the proof of Theorem 3, we have x2A = y2A > x2B = y2B,
and the last kicker’s optimal kicking strategy is ξ.
Next we study the second team’s optimal kicking strategy in Round 1. When T1 does
not score in Round 1, the value function for T2 is27
VT2,P1,E = P˜G(y1E)[φ(T1; 0 : 1)(VW+VL−VT1,P2,B)+(1−φ(T1; 0 : 1))VT2,P2,A]+(1−P˜G(y1E))VW + VL
2
,
27Recall that kicking order T1 in expression φ(T1; gT1 : gT2) refers to the beginning of the second round
when T1 kicked first in the first round.
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where
VT1,P2,B = PG(x2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x2B))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− [1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))]VW − VL
2
VT2,P2,A = PG(y2A)VW + (1− PG(y2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]VW − VL
2
Therefore
VT2,P1,E =
VW + VL
2
+ P˜G(y1E){φ(T1; 0 : 1)[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
+(1− φ(T1; 0 : 1))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)]}VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, y1E, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P˜ ′G(y1E){α1
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P˜ ′O(y1E)UO = 0, where
α1 = φ(T1; 0 : 1)[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + (1− φ(T1; 0 : 1))[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)].
When T1 scores in Round 1, the value function for T2 is
VT2,P1,B = P˜G(y1B)
VW + VL
2
+(1−P˜G(y1B))[(1−φ(T1; 1 : 0))VT2,P2,B+φ(T1; 1 : 0)(VW+VL−VT1,P2,A)],
where
VT2,P2,B = PG(y2B)PG(ξ)VL + PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(y2B))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− [1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))]VW − VL
2
VT1,P2,A = PG(x2A)VW + (1− PG(x2A))[(1− PG(ξ))VW + PG(ξ)VW + VL
2
]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]VW − VL
2
We substitute the equations of VT2,P2,B and VT1,P2,A into VT2,P1,B as follows:
VT2,P1,B =
VW + VL
2
− (1− P˜G(y1B))[(1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
+φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]]VW − VL
2
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The optimal kicking strategy, y1B, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P˜ ′G(y1B){[(1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(y2B)(1− PG(ξ))]
+φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(x2A))PG(ξ)]]VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P˜ ′O(y1B)UO = 0
Given that y2B = x2B and x2A = y2A, the first-order condition can be rewritten as
P ′G(y1B){α2
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(y1B)UO = 0, where
α2 = (1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))] + φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)].
Under a sequentially fair mechanism, φ(T1; 0 : 1) + φ(T1; 1 : 0) = 1, and we have α1 = α2.
Accordingly, y1E = y1B. Finally, we solve for T1’s optimal kicking strategy in Round 1. The
value function for T1 is
VT1 = PG(x1)[VW + VL − VT2,P1,B] + (1− PG(x1))[VW + VL − VT2,P1,E]
= VW + VL − PG(x1)VT2,P1,B − (1− PG(x1))VT2,P1,E
=
VW + VL
2
+ [PG(x1)(1− P˜G(y1B))α2 − (1− PG(x1))P˜G(y1E)α1]VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, x1, satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1){[(1− P˜G(y1B))α2 + P˜G(y1E)α1]
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1)UO = 0
=⇒ P ′G(x1){α1
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1)UO = 0
Therefore x1 = y1E = y1B, and
VT1 =
VW + VL
2
+ [PG(x1)(1− P˜G(x1))− (1− PG(x1))P˜G(x1)]α1VW − VL
2
<
VW + VL
2
.
Hence T2 has a higher chance of winning.
(ii) When the better player is in T1. Following the same procedure in (i), we conclude
x1 = y1E = y1B. But now VT1 becomes
VT1 = P˜G(x1)[VW + VL − VT2,P1,B] + (1− P˜G(x1))[VW + VL − VT2,P1,E]
= VW + VL − P˜G(x1)VT2,P1,B − (1− P˜G(x1))VT2,P1,E
=
VW + VL
2
+ [P˜G(x1)(1− PG(x1))− (1− P˜G(x1))PG(x1)]α1VW − VL
2
>
VW + VL
2
.
Again, the team with a better player has a higher chance of winning.
Proof of Theorem 5. Without loss of generality, assume T1 kicks first in the first
sudden-death round (i.e., in Round n + 1). In a state-symmetric equilibrium, denote by xI
the optimal kicking strategy for the first kicker in each sudden-death round, and xB (xE) the
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optimal kicking strategy for the second kicker in each sudden-death round when the score is
behind (tied). Let VT1 (VT2) denote T1’s (T2’s) value function at the beginning of the first
sudden-death round (Round n+ 1). Then
VT1 = [PG(xI)PG(xB) + (1− PG(xI))(1− PG(xE))]VT2
+ PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))VW + (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)VL
VT2 = [PG(xI)PG(xB) + (1− PG(xI))(1− PG(xE))]VT1
+ PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))VL + (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)VW
We substitute VT2 into the equation of VT1 as follows:
VT1 = [PG(xI)PG(xB) + (1− PG(xI))(1− PG(xE))]2VT1
+ {[PG(xI)PG(xB) + (1− PG(xI))(1− PG(xE))]PG(xI)(1− PG(xB)) + (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)}VL
+ {[PG(xI)PG(xB) + (1− PG(xI))(1− PG(xE))](1− PG(xI))PG(xE) + PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))}VW
Then VT1 can be solved as:
VT1 = γVW + (1− γ)VL, where
γ =
1− (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)
2− (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)− PG(xI)(1− PG(xB)) .
As this is a zero-sum game, we have VT2 = (1− γ)VW + γVL.
The optimal kicking strategy, xI , satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(xI){[PG(xB)− (1− PG(xE))]VT2 + (1− PG(xB))VW − PG(xE)VL +UG}+ P ′O(xI)UO = 0.
Similarly, the optimal kicking strategies xB and xE are determined by the following condi-
tions:
P ′G(xB){VT1 − VL + UG}+ P ′O(xB)UO = 0
P ′G(xE){VW − VT1 + UG}+ P ′O(xE)UO = 0
We are going to claim that all three kicking strategies are equivalent, i.e., xI = xB = xE,
which in turn implies that VT1 = VT2 =
VW+VL
2
as γ = 1
2
, and sequential fairness is established.
First we compare xI and xE. Define
∆IE = [PG(xB)− (1− PG(xE))]VT2 + (1− PG(xB))VW − PG(xE)VL − (VW − VT1)
By comparing the first-order conditions of xI and xE, we observe that
∆IE T 0 if and only if xI T xE.
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Substituting the equations of VT2 and VT1 into ∆IE gives us
∆IE = VT1 − VT2 − PG(xB)(VW − VT2) + PG(xE)(VT2 − VL)
= [2γ − 1− PG(xB)γ + PG(xE)(1− γ)](VW − VL)
= [(2− PG(xB)− PG(xE))γ − 1 + PG(xE)](VW − VL).
Plugging in the expression of γ and doing some simplifications, we have
∆IE =
PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))− PG(xB)(1− PG(xE))
2− (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)− PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))(VW − VL)
We can then conclude that xI T xE if and only if xI T xB. Next we compare xI and xB.
Define
∆IB = [PG(xB)− (1− PG(xE))]VT2 + (1− PG(xB))VW − PG(xE)VL − (VT1 − VL)
By comparing the first-order conditions of xI and xB, we observe that
∆IB T 0 if and only if xI T xB.
By the same token, we can simplify ∆IB as
∆IB =
PG(xE)(1− PG(xI))− PG(xB)(1− PG(xE))
2− (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)− PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))(VW − VL)
Therefore
xI T xB if and only if xE T xB.
Finally we compare xE and xB. Define
∆EB = VW − VT1 − (VT1 − VL)
∆EB can be simplified as
∆EB =
PG(xE)(1− PG(xI))− PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))
2− (1− PG(xI))PG(xE)− PG(xI)(1− PG(xB))(VW − VL)
Accordingly,
xE T xB if and only if xE T xI .
Combining all three observations (inequalities) above, we conclude that in a state-symmetric
equilibrium we must have xI = xE = xB.
Proof of Theorem 6. Take any mechanism φ and any sequentially fair mechanism ϕ.
Construct a mechanism ψ such that for a given Sudden-death Round k, for all n < ` < k,
kicking-order histories h`−1, and feasible scores gT1 : gT2, ψ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2) = φ(h`−1; gT1 :
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gT2) and for all ` ≥ k and ` ≤ n, kicking-order histories h`−1, and feasible scores gT1 : gT2,
ψ(h`−1; g1 : gT2) = ϕ(h`−1; gT1 : gT2).
Now in the Sudden-death Round k and after, whenever the game reaches this round, the
probability of winning is given as 1
2
for each team. By backward induction, consider Round
k− 1. Consider the team that kicks second. Without loss of generality suppose it is T2, and
T1 goes first in Round k − 1. We can reuse the same first-order conditions for both teams
that we used in the proof of Theorem 1, setting
VT1 = VT2 =
VW + VL
2
as the continuation value under the sequentially fair mechanism in Round k. Suppose x is
T1’s kicker’s optimal spot, yE is T2’s kicker’s optimal spot when they are still tied, and yB is
T1’s kicker’s optimal spot when T1 is ahead (by one goal). Recall the first-order conditions
through Equation 11 (or 3):
P ′G(x)[PG(yB)VT1 + (1− PG(yB))VW − PG(yE)VL − (1− PG(yE))VT1 + UG] + P ′O(x)UO = 0
P ′G(yB)[VT2 − VL + UG] + P ′O(yB)UO = 0
P ′G(yE)[VW − VT2 + UG] + P ′O(yE)UO = 0
We rewrite T2’s kicker’s first-order conditions plugging in VT1 = VT2:
P ′G(yB)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(yB)UO = 0
P ′G(yE)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(yE)UO = 0
The last two equations yield yB = yE (each has a unique solution by assumptions). Given
that T1’s equation yields:
P ′G(x)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(x)UO = 0
As T1 has the same first-order conditions as T2, we get x = yB = yE. So each team’s winning
probability is the same, 1
2
in Round k, as well. The mechanism ψ is sequentially fair starting
from Round k. We repeat this argument for each Sudden-death Round ` = k−2, k−3, ..., n+1
and obtain the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 7. First observe that all kickers exert the same effort in sudden-
death rounds across all sequentially fair mechanisms. Now consider a state in Round 2.
It can readily be seen from the proof of Theorem 3 that the optimal kicking strategy at
that state is solely determined by “the state” (the score difference and the kicking order in
Round 2), and hence is independent of which sequentially fair mechanism leads to that state.
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Therefore, the difference across sequentially fair mechanisms boils down to Round 1 kickers’
behavior. From the proof of Theorem 3, we observe that any sequentially fair mechanism φ
must satisfy the condition φ(T1; 0 : 1) + φ(T1; 1 : 0) = 1.28 Moreover, under this condition,
the three optimal kicking strategies in the first round are the same: x1 = y1E = y1B, and
they are determined by the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1){α1
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1)UO = 0, where
α1 = φ(T1; 1 : 0)[1− (1− PG(y2A))PG(ξ)] + (1− φ(T1; 1 : 0))[1− PG(x2B)(1− PG(ξ))].
Hence the higher the value of α1, the higher the goal efficiency. As x2B < ξ and y2A < ξ,
1 − PG(x2B)(1 − PG(ξ)) > 1 − (1 − PG(y2A))PG(ξ). Therefore maximum effort is achieved
when φ(T1; 1 : 0) = 0, i.e., when φ is a behind-first mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 8. Observe that the mechanisms that satisfy the axioms should be
behind-first, since behind-first mechanisms are the only ones that satisfy sequential fairness
and goal dominance (by Theorem 7). The mechanisms that satisfy the sudden-death equality
of opportunity (SDEO from now on) have to have each team kicking first in every two sudden-
death rounds exactly once. Hence, the only kicking order that is simple and SDEO in the
sudden-death rounds is alternating-order. Stationarity (as implied by simplicity) implies that
the order of kicking switches when the score stays even between two rounds - i.e., if the state
was reached after a tie in score, the order switches after this state if the tied score continues.
But this does not imply how the kicking order changes if we transition to a tied score from
an uneven score. Simplicity implies that we have two states as Q = {(T1)1, (T2)1}. Thus,
we need to use the same states of sudden-death rounds also in the regular rounds. Hence, as
kicking order switches when the score is tied, i.e. we transition from (T1)1 to (T2)1 or the
other way around in the sudden-death rounds, we should do the same in the regular rounds as
well. Thus, whenever a round ends with a tied score, we should reverse the kicking order. We
end up with the unique machine representation in Figure 2, i.e. with the alternating-order
behind-first.
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B Online Appendix: Three Regular Round sequen-
tially fair mechanisms
Let us define Vi,j,s to be the value function for the kicker who is the j
th kicker to kick in
Round k when the state is s = (s1, s2), where si is the score for the team who kicks i
th in
Round k. Denote by xi,j,s the optimal kicking strategy for this kicker.
Third Round, Second Kick
Whether the team is currently even or behind, the optimal kicking strategy is always x∗,
where x∗ is determined by the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x
∗)[
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(x
∗)UO = 0
Third Round, First Kick
When the score is currently even (s = (2, 2), (1, 1) or s = (0, 0)), the value function for
the team is VW+VL
2
.
When s = (0, 1), the value function for the kicker is
V3,1,(0,1) = PG(x3,1,(0,1))PG(x
∗)VL + PG(x3,1,(0,1))(1− PG(x∗))VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x3,1,(0,1)))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− [1− PG(x3,1,(0,1))(1− PG(x∗))]VW − VL
2
=
VW + VL
2
− α3,1,(0,1)VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, x3,1,(0,1), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x3,1,(0,1))[(1− PG(x∗))
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(x3,1,(0,1))UO = 0
Similarly, we have V3,1,(0,1) = V3,1,(1,2) and x3,1,(0,1) = x3,1,(1,2).
When s = (1, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V3,1,(1,0) = PG(x3,1,(1,0))VW + (1− PG(x3,1,(1,0)))[(1− PG(x∗))VW + PG(x∗)VW + VL
2
]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [1− (1− PG(x3,1,(1,0)))PG(x∗)]VW − VL
2
=
VW + VL
2
+ α3,1,(1,0)
VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, x3,1,(1,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x3,1,(1,0))[PG(x
∗)
VW − VL
2
+ UG] + P
′
O(x3,1,(1,0))UO = 0
Similarly, we have V3,1,(1,0) = V3,1,(2,1) and x3,1,(1,0) = x3,1,(2,1).
Second Round, Second Kick
Denote by φ3(s) the prob. that the first-kicking team in Round 2 kicks first in Round 3
when the state at the end of Round 2 is s.
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When s = (0, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(0,0) = PG(x2,2,(0,0))[φ3(0, 1)(VW + VL − V3,1,(0,1)) + (1− φ3(0, 1))V3,1,(1,0)] + (1− PG(x2,2,(0,0)))VW + VL
2
=
VW + VL
2
+ PG(x2,2,(0,0))α2,2,(0,0)
VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,2,(0,0) = φ3(0, 1)α3,1,(0,1) + (1− φ3(0, 1))α3,1,(1,0)
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(0,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(0,0)){α2,2,(0,0)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,2,(0,0))UO = 0
When s = (1, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(1,0) = PG(x2,2,(1,0))
VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x2,2,(1,0)))[φ3(1, 0)(VW + VL − V3,1,(1,0)) + (1− φ3(1, 0))V3,1,(0,1)]
=
VW + VL
2
− (1− PG(x2,2,(1,0)))α2,2,(1,0)VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,2,(1,0) = φ3(1, 0)α3,1,(1,0) + (1− φ3(1, 0))α3,1,(0,1).
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(1,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(1,0)){α2,2,(1,0)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,2,(1,0))UO = 0
When s = (1, 1), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(1,1) = PG(x2,2,(1,1))[φ3(1, 2)(VW + VL − V3,1,(1,2)) + (1− φ3(1, 2))V3,1,(2,1)] + (1− PG(x2,2,(1,1)))VW + VL
2
=
VW + VL
2
+ PG(x2,2,(1,1))α2,2,(1,1)
VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,2,(1,1) = φ3(1, 2)α3,1,(1,2) + (1− φ3(1, 2))α3,1,(2,1)
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(1,1), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(1,1)){α2,2,(1,1)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,2,(1,1))UO = 0
When s = (2, 1), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(2,1) = PG(x2,2,(2,1))
VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x2,2,(2,1)))[φ3(2, 1)(VW + VL − V3,1,(2,1)) + (1− φ3(2, 1))V3,1,(1,2)]
=
VW + VL
2
− (1− PG(x2,2,(2,1)))α2,2,(2,1)VW − VL
2
,
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where
α2,2,(1,0) = φ3(2, 1)α3,1,(2,1) + (1− φ3(2, 1))α3,1,(1,2).
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(2,1), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(2,1)){α2,2,(1,0)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,2,(2,1))UO = 0
When s = (0, 1), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(0,1) = PG(x2,2,(0,1))VW + (1− PG(x2,2,(0,1)))[φ3(0, 1)(VW + VL − V3,1,(0,1)) + (1− φ3(0, 1))V3,1,(1,0)]
=
VW + VL
2
+ α2,2,(0,1)
VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,2,(0,1) = PG(x2,2,(0,1)) + (1− PG(x2,2,(0,1)))[φ3(0, 1)α3,1,(0,1) + (1− φ3(0, 1))α3,1,(1,0)].
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(0,1), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(0,1)){[1−[φ3(0, 1)α3,1,(0,1)+(1−φ3(0, 1))α3,1,(1,0)]]
VW − VL
2
+UG}+P ′O(x2,2,(0,1))UO = 0
When s = (2, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V2,2,(2,0) = PG(x2,2,(2,0))[φ3(2, 1)(VW + VL − V3,1,(2,1)) + (1− φ3(2, 1))V3,1,(1,2)] + (1− PG(x2,2,(2,0)))VL
=
VW + VL
2
− α2,2,(2,0)VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,2,(2,0) = PG(x2,2,(2,0))[φ3(2, 1)α3,1,(2,1) + (1− φ3(2, 1))α3,1,(1,2)] + 1− PG(x2,2,(2,0)).
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,2,(2,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,2,(2,0)){[1−[φ3(2, 1)α3,1,(2,1)+(1−φ3(2, 1))α3,1,(1,2)]]
VW − VL
2
+UG}+P ′O(x2,2,(2,0))UO = 0
Second Round, First Kick
When s = (0, 0) or s = (1, 1), the value function for the team is VW+VL
2
.
When s = (0, 1), the value function for the kicker is
V2,1,(0,1) = PG(x2,1,(0,1))(VW + VL − V2,2,(1,1)) + (1− PG(x2,1,(0,1)))(VW + VL − V2,2,(0,1))
=
VW + VL
2
− α2,1,(0,1)VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,1,(0,1) = PG(x2,1,(0,1))PG(x2,2,(1,1))α2,2,(1,1) + (1− PG(x2,1,(0,1)))α2,2,(0,1).
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The optimal kicking strategy, x2,1,(0,1), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,1,(0,1)){[α2,2,(0,1) − PG(x2,2,(1,1))α2,2,(1,1)]
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,1,(0,1))UO = 0
When s = (1, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V2,1,(1,0) = PG(x2,1,(1,0))(VW + VL − V2,2,(2,0)) + (1− PG(x2,1,(1,0)))(VW + VL − V2,2,(1,0))
=
VW + VL
2
+ α2,1,(1,0)
VW − VL
2
,
where
α2,1,(1,0) = PG(x2,1,(1,0))α2,2,(2,0) + (1− PG(x2,1,(1,0)))(1− PG(x2,2,(1,0)))α2,2,(1,0).
The optimal kicking strategy, x2,1,(1,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x2,1,(1,0)){[α2,2,(2,0) − (1− PG(x2,2,(1,0)))α2,2,(1,0)]
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x2,1,(1,0))UO = 0
First Round, Second Kick
When s = (0, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V1,2,(0,0) = PG(x1,2,(0,0))[φ2(0, 1)(VW + VL − V2,1,(0,1)) + (1− φ2(0, 1))V2,1,(1,0)] + (1− PG(x1,2,(0,0)))VW + VL
2
=
VW + VL
2
+ PG(x1,2,(0,0))α1,2,(0,0)
VW − VL
2
,
where
α1,2,(0,0) = φ2(0, 1)α2,1,(0,1) + (1− φ2(0, 1))α2,1,(1,0).
The optimal kicking strategy, x1,2,(0,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1,2,(0,0)){α1,2,(0,0)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1,2,(0,0))UO = 0.
When s = (1, 0), the value function for the kicker is
V1,2,(1,0) = PG(x1,2,(1,0))
VW + VL
2
+ (1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))[φ2(1, 0)(VW + VL − V2,1,(1,0)) + (1− φ2(1, 0))V2,1,(0,1)]
=
VW + VL
2
− (1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0)VW − VL
2
,
where
α1,2,(1,0) = φ2(1, 0)α2,1,(1,0) + (1− φ2(1, 0))α2,1,(0,1).
The optimal kicking strategy, x1,2,(1,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1,2,(1,0)){α1,2,(1,0)
VW − VL
2
+ UG}+ P ′O(x1,2,(1,0))UO = 0.
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First Round, First Kick
The value function for the kicker is
V1,1,(0,0) = PG(x1,1,(0,0))[VW + VL − V1,2,(1,0)] + (1− PG(x1,1,(0,0)))[VW + VL − V1,2,(0,0)]
=
VW + VL
2
+ [PG(x1,1,(0,0))(1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0)
− (1− PG(x1,1,(0,0)))PG(x1,2,(0,0))α1,2,(0,0)]VW − VL
2
The optimal kicking strategy, x1,1,(0,0), satisfies the following first-order condition:
P ′G(x1,1,(0,0)){[(1−PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0)+PG(x1,2,(0,0))α1,2,(0,0)]
VW − VL
2
+UG}+P ′O(x1,1,(0,0))UO = 0
Therefore
x1,1,(0,0) R x1,2,(0,0) ⇐⇒ (1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0) R PG(x1,2,(0,0))α1,2,(0,0)
On the other hand, we have
V1,1,(0,0) =
VW + VL
2
⇐⇒ PG(x1,1,(0,0))(1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0) = (1− PG(x1,1,(0,0)))PG(x1,2,(0,0))α1,2,(0,0)
⇐⇒ (1− PG(x1,2,(1,0)))α1,2,(1,0) = (1− PG(x1,1,(0,0)))α1,2,(0,0)
The condition holds if φ2(1, 0) + φ2(0, 1) = 1.
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